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Stability of Radner Equilibria
with Respect to Small Frictions∗
Martin Herdegen† Johannes Muhle-Karbe‡
September 20, 2017
Abstract
We study risk-sharing equilibria with trading subject to small proportional transaction
costs. We show that the frictionless equilibrium prices also form an “asymptotic equilibrium”
in the small-cost limit. To wit, there exist asymptotically optimal policies for all agents and a
split of the trading cost according to their risk aversions for which the frictionless equilibrium
prices still clear the market. Starting from a frictionless equilibrium, this allows to study the
interplay of volatility, liquidity, and trading volume.
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1 Introduction
Frictions such as transaction costs play a crucial role in many parts of financial theory, cf., e.g., [55]
for an overview. A prime example is the discussion about financial transaction taxes. The study
of such regulatory measures naturally requires a general equilibrium setting, in order to assess how
changes in the playing field affect the interplay of liquidity, volatility, and trading volume.
The analysis of such models is challenging, however, because frictions exacerbate the tractabil-
ity issues inherent in general equilibrium settings. Indeed, frictions drastically complicate indi-
vidual decision making. Moreover, representative agents can only be introduced to simplify the
analysis in precisely those settings where no-trade equilibria obtain and frictions are irrelevant.
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Steven E. Shreve for fruitful discussions and to Michail Anthropelos and Sebastian Herrmann for a careful reading
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Accordingly, most of the extant literature has focused either on numerical methods,1 or on
models with various simplifying assumptions.2 This is in stark contrast to recent progress in the
analysis of partial equilibrium models with small frictions, where explicit asymptotically optimal
policies are now available in very general frameworks.3
The present study brings these asymptotic methods to bear on general equilibrium models.
This is inspired by the work of Lo, Mamaysky and Wang [48] on equilibria with small fixed trading
costs.4 Like in their model, we also focus on a risk-sharing equilibrium, where two heterogeneous
agents with constant absolute risk aversion receive random endowments and trade shares of a
correlated, dividend-paying asset to hedge their exposures. However, unlike [48], we consider rather
general dynamics that allow for unspanned aggregate risks as well as for random fluctuations of
both asset prices and agents’ positions in equilibrium. (In contrast, the equilibrium price in [48]
is constant. Other equilibrium models such as [68] or [14, 66, 67] lead to equilibria with no or
smooth trading, for which the effect of small frictions is negligible exactly or at the leading order,
respectively.) Moreover, we also determine the equilibrium interest rate endogenously, by clearing
the market for the consumption good. This is made possible by explicitly modeling “where the
transaction costs go” in equilibrium – by also solving the optimal consumption problem of the
receiver of the transaction payments.5 This in turn allows to match absolutely continuous inflows
due to endowments and dividends with the outflows due to the consumption; this would not be
possible if the singular transaction payments disappear from the model. This issue does not arise
if either the bank account does not have to clear as in [48], trading strategies are smooth as in
[66, 67, 69], or time is discrete as in [8, 9]. An interesting – but hard – question is whether market
clearing could also be achieved via singular dynamics of the interest rate as in the frictionless
model of [43]. However, in any case, modeling “where the transaction costs go” gives the model
a stronger general equilibrium flavor and opens the door to the welfare analysis of redistributive
effects, for example.
The starting point for our analysis is a frictionless baseline equilibrium, to which we then
add a small proportional transaction cost. (Other costs can be treated along the same lines,
cf. Section 4.3.) We show that there exist asymptotically optimal strategies for all agents6 and an
endogenously determined split of the transaction costs according to their risk aversions,7 such that
the frictionless equilibrium prices still clear the market. In this sense, the frictionless equilibrium
is stable with respect to the introduction of the marginal trading cost.
1Compare, e.g., [32, 8, 9] for the recursive solution of discrete-time models.
2For example, [66, 67] focus on overlapping generations models with exogenous interest rates or no risky asset,
respectively. [48] also do not endogenize the interest rate, and their equilibrium price is constant over time. [17]
studies a one-period model where transaction costs are refunded, but agents do not internalize this. [69] focuses on
a pure consumption-savings problem without risky asset.
3Early asymptotic analyses of the classical models of [49, 18, 24] can be found in [21, 64, 70, 35]. For more
recent results in general settings, cf., e.g. [65, 56, 50, 61, 41, 42, 10, 11].
4The numerical results of [48, 30] also confirm the accuracy of the small-cost asymptotics for reasonable parameter
values. Thereby, these expansions allow to “reveal the salient features of the problem while remaining a good
approximation to the full but more complicated model” [70].
5One possible interpretation is a government collecting taxes; another is the operator of an exchange receiving
fees.
6This use of approximate optimality is similar to the notion of ε-equilibria in game theory, cf. [59] and many
more recent studies.
7If agents have identical risk aversions as in [48], each of them pays the same cost. In general, more risk-averse
agents have a stronger motive to trade and are therefore willing to bear a larger share. This assumption is made
for tractability; it is relaxed in [7] in a simpler model with quadratic trading costs and preferences, where only
expected returns but not volatilities and interest rates are determined in equilibrium.
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This robustness result is not just another envelope theorem, as retaining the frictionless bench-
mark policy leads to infinite transaction costs. Instead, our result states that – at the leading order
– the effects of the friction are the same in general equilibrium as in a partial equilibrium, where
the frictionless equilibrium price remains fixed and the transaction costs are split appropriately.
This suggests that the introduction of a small financial transaction tax need not have a first-order
effect on market dynamics – even though it may substantially alter the trading strategies of mar-
ket participants with frequent trading needs. Moreover, our stability result implies that “welfare
results” obtained in partial equilibrium models remain valid at the leading order in the present
setting. An example is the finding of [42] that – in any model with small proportional transaction
costs – 1/3 of the performance losses are a true deadweight loss, while the remaining 2/3 are just
redistributed to the receiver of the transaction cost payments.
The validity of this result rests on the following assumptions. First, all agents have constant
absolute risk aversions, deterministic impatience rates, and the frictionless interest rates are de-
terministic, so that the discounted total risk tolerances are also deterministic. This assumption
crucially simplifies the analysis by abstracting from the wealth effects of transaction costs on port-
folio choice. The same assumption is made in virtually all continuous-time incomplete equilibrium
models, compare, e.g., [66, 67, 48, 14, 71, 13, 12, 45, 69]. It could be replaced by formally assuming
that transaction costs are refunded immediately as in [17], compare Section 4.3.
Second, frictionless equilibrium asset prices are sufficiently “nice” Itô processes with nontrivial
Brownian fluctuations.8 Third, agents’ optimal trading strategies are also sufficiently “nice” Itô
processes with a nontrivial Brownian component. If optimal trading strategies are smooth as in
[66, 67, 14], a different asymptotic regime with much smaller welfare effects of small transaction
costs applies. We therefore focus on agents with “high-frequency trading needs” as in [48], who
would be most affected by a financial transaction tax, for example.
The tractable models hitherto proposed in the literature do not simultaneously meet these
requirements. Indeed, the equilibrium asset prices of [48] are constant, whereas the frictionless
optimal trading strategies of [66, 67, 14] are smooth. Both asset prices and trading strategies are
diffusive in the model of [13], but the corresponding interest rates are no longer deterministic. As
a concrete example for our main result, we therefore construct a new frictionless economy that
meets all of the assumptions for our main robustness result. In this concrete model, we find that
the predictions of our “asymptotic equilibrium” are consistent with the insights gleaned from the
expansion of an exact equilibrium in the model by Lo et al. [48].9 However, our framework also
allows to study the link between trading volume and market volatility, for example, which is not
possible with constant asset prices as in [48].
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, both in its
frictionless baseline version and with proportional transaction costs. In Section 3, we summarize
our first set of main results, which concern individual optimality with small transaction costs.
The proof of these results, which extend previous results from the literature [39, 1, 10, 11] to the
model features required for general equilibrium modeling, including intertemporal consumption,
8Asset prices with different degrees of activity could also be studied as in [61] using more advanced methods of
stochastic calculus. However, this would not lead to qualitatively different results, compare Section 4.3.
9This suggests that relaxing individual optimality to an asymptotic version does not affect the equilibrium
implications at the leading order. At higher orders, other variations of the model such as initial positions, liquidation
conventions, dividend specifications, finite time horizons, etc. also play a non-negligible role. A rigorous proof of
such a result in a general setting is an important direction for future research.
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non-constant interest rates, dividends, as well as time-varying and stochastic transaction costs,
is delegated to Appendix A. Section 4 contains the statement of our main results concerning the
construction of an explicit asymptotic equilibrium with small transaction costs. It also includes
a detailed discussion of several extensions and variations of the model. The corresponding proofs
are delegated to Appendix B. Section 5 focuses on a concrete example for our main result, and
compares it to the model of [48]. The corresponding proofs are collected in Appendices C and D.
Finally, Appendix E contains auxiliary results from stochastic calculus used in the proofs.
2 Setting
2.1 Probabilistic Setup and Notation
Throughout, we fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ],F , P ) with finite time horizon
T > 0; the filtration F satisfies the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness and the
initial σ-field F0 is P -trivial.
It = t denotes the identity process and ‖A‖ the total variation of a finite-variation process A.
For an adapted càdlàg process X, we set X∗t := sups∈[0,t] |Xs|. A process X is called Itô process
if there exist an adapted drift rate µX and a predictable (instantaneous) variance ΣX ≥ 0 with∫ T
0
(|µXt |+ ΣXt ) dt <∞ such that
dXt = µ
X
t dt+
√
ΣXt dWt, (2.1)
for a P -Brownian motion W . If (2.1) holds we say that X is driven by W .10 An Itô process X
has continuous variance, if ΣX has continuous paths, and nonvanishing variance if ΣX > 0.
For Itô processes X and Y (with potentially different driving Brownian motions), ΣX,Yt =
d〈X,Y 〉t
dt denotes the corresponding (instantaneous) covariation. Finally, for an Itô process X, we
write L(X) for the set of X-integrable predictable processes, and denote by H • X the stochastic
integral of H ∈ L(X) with respect to X.
2.2 Consumption Clock
We consider an economy with a single perishable consumption good. All quantities denoted in
units of the latter are called real. There is a common consumption clock ν, a finite (deterministic)
measure on [0, T ], which describes how agents value consumption over time. We assume that
ν({0}) = 0, ν({T}) > 0 and that ν is absolutely continuous on (0, T ). The two main examples are
ν(dt) = δT (terminal consumption only) or ν(dt) = 1(0,T )(t) dt+ δT (dt) (continuous consumption
and terminal lump sum consumption).
2.3 Frictionless Market
There are two securities which are traded competitively. The first is a financial asset, henceforth
called “savings account”, in zero net supply. The second is a dividend-paying asset, hereafter called
10By Girsanov’s theorem, (2.1) remains valid under equivalent probability measures Q ≈ P after replacing the
P -drift rate µX with the Q-drift rate µX,Q and W with a Q-Brownian motion WQ.
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“stock”, in unit net supply. We assume that the (real) price process B of the savings account has
dynamics
dBt = rtBtdt, B0 = 1, (2.2)
where the (real) interest rate (rt)t∈[0,T ] satisfying
∫ T
0
|rt|dt <∞ is to be determined in equilibrium.
(It will always be deterministic below, but this is not needed for the formulation of the model.)
We often use the savings account as numéraire; the corresponding quantities are called nominal.
The stock is a claim to an exogenous (real) dividend rate process δ relative to ν. (This means
that the cumulative real dividends paid until time t are
∫ t
0
δuν(du).) We assume that δ is an Itô pro-
cess driven by a P -Brownian motionW δ. Moreover, we suppose that the (nominal, cum-dividend)
stock price is an Itô process with continuous and nonvanishing variance, driven by the same Brow-
nian motion W δ:
dSt = µ
S
t dt+
√
ΣSt dW
δ
t , S0 ∈ R+. (2.3)
Here, the initial stock price S0, the drift rate (µSt )t∈[0,T ], and the (instantaneous) variance (ΣSt )t∈[0,T ]
are to be determined in equilibrium.
At the initial time t = 0, agents start with zero savings and some position ϕˆ0 in the stock. (For
equilibrium applications, the total initial allocations of course need to match the unit net supply
of the stock.) Trading strategies are in turn described by predictable processes ϕ ∈ L(S), where
ϕt denotes the number of shares in the stock held at time t > 0.11 To rule out doubling strategies,
we assume that the set M2(S) of equivalent martingale measures for S with square-integrable
density is nonempty and focus on admissible strategies which satisfy12
ϕ • S is a Q-supermartingale for all Q ∈M2(S). (2.4)
In addition to the gains and losses generated by trading, agents receive a (nominal) cumulative
endowment process Y , which is adapted and of finite variation. In most examples, it is derived from
a (real) endowment rate process y relative to the consumption clock ν satisfying
∫ T
0
|yt| ν(dt) <∞.
In this case, the (nominal) cumulative endowment is Yt =
∫ t
0
yt
Bt
ν(dt).
Agents use their endowments and gains from trading to finance (real) consumption rates c sat-
isfying E
[(∫ T
0
|ct| ν(dt)
)2]
<∞. (This means that the cumulative amount consumed until time
t is
∫ t
0
cuν(du).) The (nominal) wealth process corresponding to an endowment Y , an admissible
trading strategy ϕ, and a consumption rate c is
dXϕ,c,Yt = ϕt dSt −
ct
Bt
ν(dt) + dYt, X
ϕ,c,Y
0 = ϕˆ0S0. (2.5)
A consumption rate c is called feasible for a given admissible strategy ϕ and an endowment Y if
Xϕ,c,YT ≥ 0. (2.6)
The controls available to each agent are the admissible portfolio/consumption pairs, each of which
11As is customary, the corresponding dynamics of the savings account are implicitly determined by the self-
financing condition (2.5).
12If the stock price is sufficiently integrable, this class includes bounded and other sufficiently integrable strategies.
Similar notions of admissibility for utilities defined on the whole real line are used in [19, 63], for example.
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are consisting of an admissible trading strategy and a corresponding feasible consumption rate.
This set is denoted by A(ϕˆ0, Y ).
2.4 Market with Frictions
To the above economy, we now add proportional transaction costs for purchases and sales of the
stock. This means that when buying or selling d‖ϕ‖t shares, agents have to pay a cost of εt d‖ϕ‖t,
where the nonnegative, adapted transaction cost process (εt)t∈[0,T ] describes the absolute size of
the trading cost. This allows to cover as special cases two specifications typically used in the
literature: transaction costs proportional to the amount of wealth transacted (cf. [49, 15] and
many more recent studies), or transaction costs proportional to the number of shares bought or
sold (e.g., [66, 36, 50]).
Admissibility with transaction costs is defined in direct analogy to the corresponding frictionless
notion (2.4) by requiring that the (cost-adjusted) gains process is a supermartingale under all
(square-integrable) equivalent martingale measures:
ϕ • S − ε • ‖ϕ‖ is a Q-supermartingale for all Q ∈M2(S). (2.7)
We then also say that ϕ is ε-admissible.
Remark 2.1. For strictly positive transaction costs, the supermartingale condition (2.7) implies,
in particular, that admissible trading strategies with transaction costs are a.s. of finite varia-
tion. Indeed, by Lemma E.5, a strategy ϕ satisfies (2.7) if and only if it satisfies the frictionless
admissibility condition (2.4) and
EQ
[∫
(0,T ]
εt d‖ϕ‖t
]
<∞ for all Q ∈M2(S). (2.8)
The (nominal) frictional wealth process corresponding to an admissible trading strategy ϕ, a
consumption rate c, a cumulative endowment process Y , and a transaction cost process ε is
dXϕ,c,Y,εt = ϕt dSt − εt d‖ϕ‖t −
ct
Bt
ν(dt) + dYt, X
ϕ,c,Y,ε
0 = ϕˆ0S0. (2.9)
Again in direct analogy to the frictionless case (2.6), a consumption rate c is called feasible for a
given admissible trading strategy ϕ, an endowment process Y , and transaction cost process ε if
Xϕ,c,Y,εT ≥ 0. (2.10)
The set of admissible portfolio/consumption pairs with transaction cost process ε consists of admis-
sible trading strategies and corresponding feasible consumption rates; it is denoted by Aε(ϕˆ0, Y ).
3 Individual Optimality
In this section, we consider the agents’ individual optimization problems, taking a savings account
B as in (2.2) and a cum-dividend stock price S as in (2.3) as exogenously given. These results
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are the building blocks for the general equilibrium results presented in Section 4. Throughout, we
assume that the interest rate (rt)t∈[0,T ] is deterministic; more general specifications would require
a wealth-dependent shift of the no-trade region corresponding to the optimal policy, compare the
discussion in [42].
3.1 Preferences
We consider three agents i = 1, 2, 3 with constant absolute risk aversions γi > 0 and deterministic
impatience rates βi(t). That is, their (time-dependent) utility functions are
U it (x) = − exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βi(u) du
)
exp
(−γix) . (3.1)
3.2 Agents’ Individual Optimization Problems
Agents i = 1, 2 and Agent 3 play different roles in the economy. Whereas Agents 1 and 2 trade
the stock to share their endowment risks, Agent 3 solves a pure consumption-savings problem.
With transaction costs, Agent 3 receives the transaction cost payments made by Agents 1 and 2
and can therefore be interpreted as a government collecting taxes or the operator of an exchange
receiving trading fees. By smoothing out the (singular) transaction cost payments, Agent 3 allows
to clear the goods market for standard models where endowments and dividends arrive with finite
rates. Note that matching this exogenous absolutely-continuous supply and Agent 1 and 2’s (also
absolutely continuous) consumption demand with the transaction cost payments directly is not
possible for diffusive asset dynamics, because the transaction costs then are of local-time type (i.e.,
they are either zero or paid at an infinite rate).
This issue does not arise in the model of [48], where the savings account is exogenous and only
the stock market has to clear. It is also absent from discrete-time models (where both in- and
outflows are discrete) and from models with quadratic trading costs (where trading rates and in
turn transaction costs are absolutely continuous). With small proportional transaction costs, the
introduction of Agent 3 could also be avoided without affecting our main results by smoothing
out Agent 1 and 2’s trading strategies appropriately, compare Section 4.3. However, explicitly
modeling the entity receiving the transaction costs allows to formulate a continuous-time notion
of equilibrium with proportional transaction costs of arbitrary size. Moreover, modeling “where
the transaction costs go”, rather than letting them disappear from the model, gives the model a
stronger general equilibrium flavor and opens the door to the welfare analysis of redistributive
effects, for example.
Agents 1 and 2
Agents 1 and 2 receive (real) endowments at rates (y1t )t∈[0,T ] and (y2t )t∈[0,T ] and trade both the
financial and the dividend-paying asset to share the corresponding risks.
They start at time t = 0 with zero savings and ϕˆ10 ≥ 0 and ϕˆ20 ≥ 0 shares of the stock,
respectively, where ϕˆ10 + ϕˆ20 = 1 to ensure initial stock market clearing.
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Frictionless optimization. In the frictionless economy of Section 2.3, Agent i = 1, 2 solves
E
[∫ T
0
U it (ct) ν(dt)
]
→ max!
(ϕ,c)∈A(ϕˆi0,Y i)
, (3.2)
where Y it =
∫
(0,t]
yit
Bt
ν(dt) is the respective nominal cumulative endowment. The frictionless
optimization problem (3.2) has been the subject of intensive research [27, 62, 19, 37, 53, 63, 5, 6, 54].
In the present study, a sufficiently regular solution is our point of departure for the analysis of an
additional small transaction cost. Whence, we henceforth assume that for i = 1, 2 there exist:
i) an admissible portfolio/consumption pair (ϕˆi, cˆi), where ϕˆi is an Itô process with continuous
and nonvanishing volatility, E
[∫ T
0
|U it (cˆit)| ν(dt)
]
< ∞, and the budget constraint (2.6) is
satisfied with equality;
ii) a positive square-integrable martingale (Zˆit)t∈[0,T ] such that the corresponding marginal
pricing measure Qˆi ≈ P on FT given by dQˆi = Zˆ
i
T
Zˆi0
dP is an equivalent martingale measure
for S;
such that the gains process ϕˆi • S is a Qˆi-martingale and the consumption rate cˆi is linked to the
martingale Zˆi by the following first-order condition:
U i′t (cˆt) =
Zˆit
Bt
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.3)
These conditions imply the optimality of (ϕˆi, cˆi) for (3.2); see Lemma A.1. Their validity in a
concrete model is verified in Section 5.
Frictional optimization. In the market with transaction costs described in Section 2.4, Agent
i ∈ {1, 2} solves
E
[∫ T
0
U it (ct) ν(dt)
]
→ max!
(ϕ,c)∈Aεi (ϕˆi0,Y i)
, (3.4)
where (εit)t∈[0,T ] is the proportional trading cost of agent i. We assume that
εit = εα
iEt.
Here, the (small) parameter ε > 0 controls the size of the total transaction costs, whereas the
equilibrium weights α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1) with α1 + α2 = 1 describe how Agents 1 and 2 split the
exogenous normalized transaction cost (Et)t∈[0,T ], a positive adapted Itô process with continuous
variance. If agents’ risk aversions are identical as in [48], each of them will pay half of the total
trading cost in equilibrium, cf. Theorem 4.1. In general, a larger share will be allocated to the
more risk-averse agent, who has a stronger motive to hedge her endowment risk.
Asymptotic optimality. The optimization problem (3.4) with transaction costs is intractable
already in simple concrete models. As a way out, we look for portfolio/consumption pairs
(ϕˆ1,ε, cˆ1,ε) and (ϕˆ2,ε, cˆ2,ε) that are asymptotically optimal for small transaction costs. This means
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that the policies should minimize the performance loss compared to the frictionless case at the
leading asymptotic order as ε goes to zero, cf. Theorem 3.2.
Such asymptotically optimal policies have been determined for rather general asset price dy-
namics by [50, 65, 56, 61, 41, 42, 10]. Here, we extend these results to include the additional
features required for a general equilibrium setting: intermediate consumption, non-constant in-
terest rates, dividends, as well as random and time-varying transaction costs. Modulo stopping
(needed to ensure that the candidate strategy is sufficiently integrable), the asymptotically optimal
trading strategy corresponds to the minimal amount of trading necessary to remain in a random
and time-dependent no-trade region
[ϕˆi − ε 13 ∆ϕi, ϕˆi + ε 13 ∆ϕi] (3.5)
around the frictionless optimizer ϕˆi. Here, the normalized halfwidth of the no-trade region is
∆ϕit :=
(
3
2
αiEt
At
γi
Σϕˆ
i
t
ΣSt
) 1
3
, (3.6)
where the annuity process (At)t∈[0,T ] (the nominal value of a unit payment stream) is given by
At =
∫
[t,T ]
1
Bs
ν(ds). (3.7)
Like for the other primitives of the model, we assume that ∆ϕi is an Itô process with continuous
variance.13 The existence of strategies ϕˆi,ε, i = 1, 2, corresponding to the minimal amount of
trading to remain in the no-trade regions (3.5) is then guaranteed by [1, Lemma 4.1.1]:
Proposition 3.1. Let i ∈ {1, 2}. For each ε > 0, there exists a unique continuous adapted process
(∆ϕi,ε)t∈[0,T ] null at 0 taking values in [−ε 13 ∆ϕi, ε 13 ∆ϕi], which satisfies on (0, T ] the Skorokhod
SDE
d∆ϕi,εt = −dϕˆit
with instantaneous reflection at ±ε 13 ∆ϕi. (That is, ∆ϕi,ε has an “infinite inward-pointing drift”
at ±ε 13 ∆ϕi so that ∆ϕi,ε does not leave the interval [−ε 13 ∆ϕi, ε 13 ∆ϕi].)
Set ϕi,ε = ϕˆi + ∆ϕi,ε so that ϕi,ε takes values in the no-trade region (3.5). An appropriately
stopped version of ϕi,ε is indeed asymptotically optimal for small transaction costs:14
Theorem 3.2. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and fix `i ∈ R. Suppose the interest rate (rt)t∈[0,T ] is determin-
istic and the integrability conditions in Assumption A.2 are satisfied for some κ > 0. Then, the
13If Ei, Σϕˆ
i
, and ΣS are positive Itô processes, this follows from Itô’s formula. Drift and quadratic variation of
∆ϕi under Qˆi can then be expressed in terms of their counterparts for E, Σϕˆ
i
, and ΣS . However, the integrability
conditions required below are most conveniently expressed in terms of ∆ϕi.
14This extends the main result of [39] to random endowments, deterministic interest rates, intermediate con-
sumption as well as random and time-varying transaction costs.
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portfolio/consumption pair
ϕˆi,ε := ϕi,ε1J0,τˆ iεK + `i1Kτˆ iε,T K,
cˆi,ε := cˆi − ε
i
A
• ‖ϕˆi,ε‖+ ϕˆ
i,ε − ϕˆi
A
• S,
is admissible and optimal for (3.4) at the leading-order O(ε
2
3 ):
E
[∫ T
0
U it (cˆ
i,ε
t ) ν(dt)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
U it (cˆ
i
t) ν(dt)
]
− 3
4
ε
2
3 Zˆi0E
Qˆi
[∫ T
0
αiEt
∆ϕit
Σϕˆ
i
t dt
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ) (3.8)
= sup
(ϕε,cε)∈Aεi (ϕˆi0,Y i)
E
[∫ T
0
U it (c
ε
t ) ν(dt)
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ). (3.9)
Here, the family (τˆ iε)ε>0 of stopping times defined in (A.23) satisfies Qˆi[τ iε < T ] = o(ε
2
3 ).
Remark 3.3. The strategy ϕˆi,ε coincides with the reflected process ϕi,ε until time τˆ iε, when it
is terminated to the static position `i. For individual optimality in partial equilibrium models,
liquidation of the stock position (`i = 0) is the canonical choice – this corresponds to closing out
the portfolio to limit excessive losses. In general equilibrium models, the liquidation portfolios
need to add up to the unit net supply of the stock, i.e., `1 + `2 = 1. As the transaction costs
become small, the probability of this liquidation becomes negligible.
Agent 3
We now turn to Agent 3, who does not trade the stock. Starting from zero savings and given an
exogenous endowment rate (y3t )t∈[0,T ], Agent 3 solves a pure consumption-savings problem.
Frictionless optimization. In the frictionless baseline model, Agent 3’s optimization problem
is
E
[∫ T
0
U3t (ct) ν(dt)
]
→ max!
(0,c)∈A(0,Y 3)
, (3.10)
where Y 3t =
∫
(0,t]
y3t
Bt
ν(dt). Like for Agent 1 and 2, we assume that there exist:
i) a feasible consumption rate cˆ3 with E
[∫ T
0
|U3t (cˆ3t )| ν(dt)
]
< ∞ such that the budget con-
straint (2.10) (with ϕ ≡ 0) is satisfied with equality;
ii) a positive square-integrable martingale (Zˆ3t )t∈[0,T ] with corresponding marginal pricing mea-
sure Qˆ3 ≈ P on FT given by dQˆi = Zˆ
i
T
Zˆi0
dP ;
such that
U3′t (cˆ
3
t ) =
Zˆ3t
Bt
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.11)
This first-order condition implies that cˆ3 is optimal for (3.10); cf. [34, Lemma 3.1]. Its validity in
a concrete model is verified in Section 5.
10
Frictional optimization. In the economy with transaction costs, Agent 3 receives the transac-
tion costs paid by Agents 1 and 2 in addition to her baseline endowment Y 3. If Agents 1 and 2 use
the asymptotically optimal strategies ϕˆ1,ε and ϕˆ2,ε from Theorem 3.2, Agent 3’s total endowment
in turn is
Y 3 + ∆Y ε, where ∆Y ε := ε1 • ‖ϕˆ1,ε‖+ ε2 • ‖ϕˆ2,ε‖.
Her consumption-savings problem then reads as follows:
E
[∫ T
0
U3t (ct) ν(dt)
]
→ max!
(0,c)∈A(0,Y 3+∆Y ε)
. (3.12)
Theorem 3.4. Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 are satisfied and, in addition, the inte-
grability conditions in Assumption A.3 hold.15 Then, the consumption rate
cˆ3,ε = cˆ3 +
ε1
A
• ‖ϕˆ1,ε‖+ ε
2
A
• ‖ϕˆ2,ε‖
is feasible and optimal at the leading order O(ε
2
3 ) for (3.12):
E
[∫ T
0
U3t (cˆ
3,ε
t ) ν(dt)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
U3t (cˆ
3
t ) ν(dt)
]
+
1
2
ε
2
3 Zˆ30E
Qˆ3
[∫ T
0
Et
(
α1
Σϕˆ
1
t
∆ϕ1t
+ α2
Σϕˆ
2
t
∆ϕ2t
)
dt
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ) (3.13)
≥ sup
(0,c)∈A(0,Y 3+∆Y ε)
E
[∫ T
0
U3t (c
ε
t ) ν(dt)
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ). (3.14)
4 Equilibrium
In Section 3 we have considered the agents’ individual optimization problems, taking the asset
price dynamics as exogenously given. Now, we extend this analysis to a general equilibrium setting,
where asset prices are determined endogenously by matching supply and demand. As in Section 3,
our starting point is a sufficiently regular frictionless baseline model, which we then perturb with
a small proportional transaction cost.
4.1 Frictionless Equilibrium
In the frictionless market from Section 2.3 we use the standard notion of equilibrium [58, 22, 44].
To wit, a (Radner) equilibrium is a tuple (r, S0, µS ,ΣS , ϕˆ1, cˆ1, ϕˆ2, cˆ2, cˆ3) for which the frictionless
market with real interest rate r and cum-dividend stock price (2.3) with initial value S0, drift µS ,
and (continuous and positive) instantaneous variance ΣS satisfies:
i) (ϕˆi, cˆi) ∈ A(ϕˆi0, Y i) is optimal for Agent i = 1, 2’s optimization problem (3.2), and (0, cˆ3) ∈
A(0, Y 3) is optimal for Agent 3’s optimization problem (3.10).
ii) ϕˆ1 + ϕˆ2 = 1, i.e., the stock market clears.
15In particular, the interest rate is deterministic.
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iii) cˆ1 + cˆ2 + cˆ3 = δ + y1 + y2 + y3, i.e., the goods market clears.
Throughout, we assume that a frictionless equilibrium exists, which satisfies the assumptions
for the agents’ individual optimization problems made in Sections 3.2. This is verified for a concrete
model in Section 5.
4.2 Equilibrium with Friction
We now turn to Radner equilibria with transaction costs. As in Section 3, this means that whenever
Agents 1 and 2 trade the stock, together they have to pay a total proportional transaction cost
εt = εEt, where the (small) parameter ε controls the size of the cost, whereas its dynamics
are described by the Itô process E. Both of these quantities are exogenous; in contrast, we
endogenously determine how the transaction cost is split between the agents in equilibrium, where
the more risk averse agent has a stronger motive to trade and is therefore willing to bear higher
trading costs. (If all agents have the same risk aversion as in Lo et al. [48], then each agent pays
approximately half of the cost both in their and in our model, compare [48, Equation (32b)] and
Theorem 4.1, respectively.)
Accordingly, an asymptotic (Radner) equilibrium with small transaction costs is defined as a
tuple (rε, Sε0 , µS,ε,ΣS,ε, α1, α2, ϕˆ1,ε, cˆ1,ε, ϕˆ2,ε, cˆ2,ε, c3,ε) such that the frictional market with real
interest rate rε, cum-dividend stock price (2.3) with initial value Sε0 , drift µS,ε and (continuous
and positive) instantaneous variance ΣS,ε, and transaction costs (εit)t∈[0,T ] = (εαiEt)t∈[0,T ] for
Agent i ∈ {1, 2}, satisfies:
i) (ϕˆi,ε, cˆi,ε
i
) ∈ Aεi(ϕˆi0, Y i) is asymptotically optimal for Agent i = 1, 2’s optimization prob-
lem (3.4), and (0, cˆ3,ε) ∈ A(0, Y 3+∆Y ε) is asymptotically optimal for Agent 3’s optimization
problem (3.12).
ii) ϕˆ1 + ϕˆ2 = 1, i.e., the stock market clears.
iii) cˆ1 + cˆ2 + cˆ3 = δ + y1 + y2 + y3, i.e., the goods market clears.
iv) α1 + α2 = 1, i.e., the total transaction costs are split between Agents 1 and 2.
Note that this notion of equilibrium is asymptotic in the sense that we only require the
agents’ policies to be asymptotically optimal for small transaction costs, similar to the concept of
ε-equilibria in game theory, cf. [59] and many more recent studies. In contrast, market clearing is
enforced exactly.
We are now ready to state our main stability result. It shows that if the agents split the
transaction costs appropriately, then the frictionless equilibrium prices still clear the market:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose there exists a frictionless equilibrium (r, S0, µS ,ΣS , ϕˆ1, cˆ1, ϕˆ2, cˆ2, cˆ3) in
the sense of Section 4.1, for which the assumptions of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 are satisfied.16 Then,
if the transaction costs are split according to Agent 1 and 2’s shares of the total risk aversion,
α1 =
γ1
γ1 + γ2
and α2 =
γ1
γ1 + γ2
, (4.1)
16In particular, the interest rate has to be deterministic.
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the frictionless equilibrium prices also support an asymptotic equilibrium with small transaction
costs. To wit, with rε = r, Sε0 = S0, µS,ε = µS, ΣS,ε = ΣS, and the corresponding asymptotically
optimal policies (ϕˆ1,ε, cˆ1,ε) and (ϕˆ2,ε, cˆ2,ε) from Theorem 3.2 (with `1 = `2 = 12), and cˆ
3,ε from The-
orem 3.4, the tuple (rε, Sε0 , µS,ε,ΣS,ε, α1, α2, ϕˆ1,ε, cˆ1,ε, ϕˆ2,ε, cˆ2,ε, cˆ3,ε) is an asymptotic equilibrium
with small transaction costs.17
4.3 Robustness checks
In this section, we explore several modifications of our model and discuss to what extent they
affect the validity of Theorem 4.1.
Redistribution of the transaction costs. In our model, the entity receiving the transaction
costs (Agent 3) is modeled explicitly for two reasons. On the one hand, by smoothing the singular
transaction costs payments into an absolutely continuous consumption stream, this additional
agent allows to clear the goods market in standard models where endowments and dividends are
paid at finite rates. On the other hand, we think that modeling “where the transaction costs go”
gives the model a stronger general equilibrium flavor then simply letting them disappear outside
the model.
However, for the validity of Theorem 4.1 in the context of asymptotically small transaction
costs the presence of the third agent is not crucial. Indeed, one can replace Agent 1 and 2’s singular
continuous strategies (which do not trade in the interior of the respective no-trade regions, but
at an infinite rate once their boundaries are breached) by suitably smoothed approximations. As
the transaction costs tend to zero, the performance of these approximating strategies becomes
indistinguishable from the policies in Theorem 3.2.
Other trading costs. Another important variation of the model concerns the nature of the
exogenous trading costs. We have chosen to work with proportional costs because most proposals
and implementations of financial transaction taxes are of this form. However, modulo technical
details, the main message of Theorem 4.1 remains valid much more broadly.
This is most easily seen for fixed transaction costs as considered by Lo et al. [48]. In this case,
the optimal policies again correspond to no-trade regions, where the present position is simply held
until the boundaries are breached. When this happens, fixed costs make it optimal to rebalance
all the way back to the frictionless target portfolio, rather than just performing the minimal
amount of trading to remain in the no-trade region as is optimal with proportional costs. Despite
this technical difference (which leads to an impulse rather than a singular control problem), the
respective asymptotically optimal policies are of a very similar form. Indeed, Formula (3.6) for
the optimal halfwidth remains valid, up to a change of the power and constant [46, 48, 61, 4, 10,
11, 26]. An inspection of the proof of Theorem 4.1 in turn shows that – with the same split of the
transaction costs according to agents’ risk aversions – the frictionless equilibrium prices also still
clear the market with small fixed costs.
Mutatis mutandis, the same remains true with quadratic costs levied on the turnover rate of
the portfolio [2, 28, 29, 3, 31, 52]. In this case, there is no no-trade region; instead, agents always
17Note that the liquidation times τˆ1ε and τˆ2ε of Agents 1 and 2, defined in (A.23), coincide.
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trade towards the frictionless target portfolio with a finite, absolutely continuous rate. To achieve
stock market clearing, these trading rates have to match for Agents 1 and 2. The explicit formula
from [52] shows that this is once more satisfied if and only if each agent’s share of the total trading
cost is given by (4.1). The remaining arguments for market clearing can then be carried through
verbatim as in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
In summary, these results suggest that the validity of Theorem 4.1 is not intimately linked to
the precise nature of the trading cost.
Non-diffusive prices. The asymptotic analysis of the agents’ individual optimizations problems
crucially exploits that asset prices and endowments are driven by diffusion processes, so that
the frictionless optimal strategies generically have nontrivial Brownian components as well. For
example, it is a consequence of elementary scaling properties of Brownian motion that the leading-
order welfare effect of small proportional costs is of order O(ε
2
3 ), cf. [35, 60]. If the primitives
of the frictionless model are driven by processes whose fluctuations scale differently, then both
the asymptotic orders and the constants determining the optimal trading policies change. The
intuition is that smoother target strategies can be tracked with less rebalancing, so that the optimal
no-trade regions are narrower and the corresponding welfare effect is smaller.
However, the results of Rosenbaum and Tankov [61, Proposition 3] suggest that also in such
more general settings, Theorem 4.1 still applies as long as infinitesimally small up and down
movements are equally likely for the driving processes.18 As a consequence, the fine structure of
the underlying processes also does not play an overly important role.
More general utilities. Whereas Theorem 4.1 is robust with respect to the variations of the
model discussed so far, the assumption that all agents have constant absolute risk aversion plays a
crucial role. Indeed, if risk aversions are not constant, the wealth effects of transaction costs alter
the target portfolio, which no longer coincides with the frictionless optimizer in this case. To wit,
with transaction costs wealth is typically lower, so that investors with decreasing absolute risk
aversion typically reduce their demand for the risky asset. This in turn leads to a downward shift
of the no-trade region for both Agents 1 and 2,19 cf. [42, Equation (3.2)]. As a result, stock market
clearing can no longer be achieved by retaining the frictionless equilibrium prices and splitting the
trading costs so as to match the halfwidths of the respective no-trade regions.
The wealth effect evidently disappears if transaction costs are immediately refunded as in [17],
and if agents do not internalize this then the asymptotically optimal no-trade regions remain
unchanged (up to inserting the current indirect risk aversion at each time and state [42, Equation
(3.2)]). In a numerical study of a discrete-time model populated by agents with constant relative
risk aversion [9], “the refund leads to almost no change in the choices of individual investors”. This
suggests that also in our model, disregarding the shift of the midpoint of the asymptotically optimal
no-trade region should not lead to big quantitative effects that invalidate the broad conclusions of
Theorem 4.1.
18This means that the corresponding jump measures, which describe the intensities with which jumps of various
sizes occur, are symmetric for small jumps.
19E.g., with power utilities, the target fractions still coincide with their frictionless counterparts [42, Section 4],
but the corresponding target number of shares is lower if wealth is reduced due to transaction costs.
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Exogenous split of the trading costs. Theorem 4.1 states that the frictionless equilibrium
prices still clear the market if the transaction costs are split between Agent 1 and 2 according
to their risk aversions. This corresponds to a reduced-form model for a bargaining mechanism in
which the agent with the stronger motive to trade bears a larger share of the exogenous cost. If this
mechanism is replaced by an equal split of the transaction costs, for example, then Theorem 4.1
only remains valid if the risk aversions of Agent 1 and 2 match as in the model of Lo et al. [48].
In contrast, for heterogenous risk aversions, an adjustment to the frictionless equilibrium prices
(e.g., a liquidity premium that depends on the agents’ current positions and their dynamics) is
required. This is an important direction for future research, that is initiated in [7] in a simpler
version of the present model, where trading costs and preferences are quadratic and only expected
returns (but not volatilities and interest rates) are determined in equilibrium.
5 A Frictionless Benchmark Economy
In this section, we consider a concrete example for our main result, Theorem 4.1. This serves two
purposes. On the one hand, the resulting closed-form frictionless equilibrium dynamics allow to
shed further light on the interdependencies between volatility, small transaction costs, and trading
volume. On the other hand, the example illustrates that all our technical assumptions can indeed
be verified in a specific setting.
The main assumptions for Theorem 4.1 are that i) frictionless equilibrium asset prices and
trading strategies have to be diffusions with nontrivial quadratic variations, and ii) frictionless
equilibrium interest rates need to be deterministic. These assumptions are not met by the models
hitherto considered in the literature. For example, the equilibrium asset price of [48] is constant;
conversely, the trading strategies in [66, 67, 14] are continuous deterministic functions. The setting
closest to our requirements is put forward in [13]. In their model, both equilibrium prices and
strategies are diffusions, but the corresponding interest rates are stochastic.
Building on these studies, we now introduce a frictionless benchmark model that leads to
deterministic interest rates, but stochastic and time-varying trading strategies and asset prices.
5.1 Exogenous Inputs
To define the exogenous inputs of the model, suppose that (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) supports four
independent Brownian motions (W δt ,W
ξ
t ,W
1
t ,W
2
t )t∈[0,T ].
We assume that the consumption clock is given by ν( dt) = 1(0,T ) dt+ δT .
As in [14], the (real) dividend rate follows an (inhomogeneous) Brownian motion with drift:20
dδt = µ
δ(t) dt+
√
Σδ(t) dW δt , δ0 ∈ R+, (5.1)
for a continuous deterministic function µδ(t) and a deterministic continuously differentiable func-
tion Σδ(t), where Σδ > 0.
20As in [14], this specification leads to a diffusive equilibrium price. In contrast, a constant price obtains if the
cumulative dividends follows Brownian motion as in [48].
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Agent i = 1, 2’s (real) endowment rates have dynamics
dyit = µ
yi(t) dt+
√
Σyi(t) dW it + ξ
i
t dW
δ
t , y
i
0 ∈ R+. (5.2)
Here, the drift rate µy
i
(t) and the variance Σy
i
(t) ≥ 0 of the unspanned endowment are also
continuous deterministic functions.21 In contrast, the volatility ξit of the part of the endowment
that will turn out to be spanned by the dividend-paying stock is stochastic.22 Like the dividend
rate, it follows an (inhomogeneous) Brownian motion with drift:
dξit = µ
ξi(t) dt+ σξ
i
(t) dW ξt , ξ
i
0 ∈ R+, (5.3)
for deterministic continuously differentiable functions µξ
i
(t) and σξ
i
(t). Crucially, we assume that
the aggregate volatility-of-volatility of the spanned endowment vanishes:
σξ
1
(t) + σξ
2
(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.4)
If this assumption is not satisfied, the equilibrium interest rate cannot be deterministic, compare
[13]. This requirement is met, in particular, if the aggregate spanned endowment is zero like in
[48]. For the applicability of the stability results, we also need to assume that σξ
i 6= 0 (this will
ensure that stock positions are diffusive) and that |σξi(0)|+ ∫ T
0
|σξi′(u)|du is sufficiently small (to
ensure enough integrability, cf. Appendix C.3).
The endowment rate of Agent 3 (who receives the transaction cost payments) is for simplicity
assumed to be constant, y3t = y30 ∈ R.
Finally, we assume for simplicity that the normalized transactions costs are constant, E = 1.
5.2 Equilibrium Outputs
We now describe the frictionless equilibrium in the above model; for better readability, the deriva-
tion of these results is deferred to Appendix C.
First, the equilibrium (nominal) market price of risk λS for the stock is deterministic and given
by23
λS(t) =
√
Σδ(t) +
∑2
i=1 ξ
i
t
1
γ1 +
1
γ2
. (5.5)
Second, the (real) equilibrium interest rate r is also deterministic. It is the unique solution to
21As in [13], stochastic volatility of the unspanned endowment would lead to stochastic interest rates.
22This specification is motivated by [48]; it leads to diffusive trading strategies. In contrast, if the spanned
endowment volatility is zero as in [14], then the corresponding optimal strategies are deterministic.
23Note that even though ξ1 and ξ2 are stochastic, their sum is not, cf. (5.4).
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the following integral equation:24
r(t) =
1∑3
i=1
1
γi
[
3∑
i=1
βi(t)
γi
+ µδ(t) +
2∑
i=1
µy
i
(t)− 1
2
2∑
i=1
1
γi
(
λS(t)
)2 − 1
2
2∑
i=1
γiΣy
i
(t)
− 1
2
2∑
i=1
γiσξ
i
(t)2
(∫ T
t
A(u)
A(t)
λS(u) du
)2 ]
,
(5.6)
where A(t) =
∫
[t,T ]
exp(− ∫ u
0
r(v) dv) ν(du) denotes the annuity process.
Third, like in most tractable equilibrium models (e.g., [23, 14]), the (nominal) equilibrium stock
variance coincides with the (real) dividend variance up to appropriate discounting and therefore
is also deterministic:
ΣS(t) = A(t)2Σδ(t). (5.7)
The (nominal) drift rate of the stock is in turn given by another deterministic function:
µS(t) = λS(t)A(t)
√
Σδ(t). (5.8)
The corresponding initial stock price is a lengthy but explicit expression of the model parameters
and the annuity process A, see (C.3).
Fourth, the optimal trading strategies of Agent i = 1, 2 in this economy are
ϕˆit =

1√
Σδ(t)
(
1
γiλ
S(t)− ξit
)
, if t > 0,
ϕˆi0, if t = 0.
(5.9)
Evidently, these stock positions are diffusive precisely if the spanned endowment volatilities-of-
volatilities ξit are stochastic processes with nontrivial quadratic variation. Moreover note that due
to (5.4), we have 〈ϕˆ1〉 = 〈ϕˆ2〉. The corresponding optimal consumption rates of Agents i = 1, 2
are Itô processes with dynamics
dcˆit = −
1
γi
(
dM it −
1
2
d〈M i〉t +
(
βi(t)− r(t)) dt) , (5.10)
where cˆi0 is a lengthy but explicit expression of the model parameters and the annuity process A,
see (C.4), and M i is a martingale driven by W d, W i, and W ξi with deterministic and bounded
integrands which involve the model parameters and A, see (C.1).
Finally, the optimal consumption rate of Agent 3 is deterministic and satisfies
dcˆ3(t) = − 1
γ3
(
β3(t)− r(t))dt, (5.11)
where cˆ30 is an explicit expression of the model parameters and the annuity process A, see (C.5).
In summary, the exogenous inputs from Section 5.1 lead to a frictionless equilibrium where both
the stock price and the agents’ stock positions are stochastic processes with nontrivial quadratic
24Existence and uniqueness are established in Lemma D.1. If σξ
i
t = 0 so that the spanned endowment volatilities
are deterministic as in [14], then the last term in the second factor of (5.6) disappears, and a closed-form solution
obtains.
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variations. Nevertheless, the corresponding interest rate remains deterministic, as required for the
application of Theorem 4.1.
5.3 Effects of Small Transaction Costs
Let us now discuss how the above equilibrium changes with the introduction of small proportional
transaction costs ε. By Theorem 4.1, if the fraction of the cost paid by Agent i is her share of the
total risk aversion, αi = γi/(γ1 + γ2), then the trading strategies corresponding to the no-trade
regions with halfwidth (the equality is obtained by inserting (5.7) and (5.9))
∆NTεt =
(
3εAt
2(γ1 + γ2)
d〈ϕˆ1〉t
d〈S〉t
) 1
3
=
(
3
2
ε
At(γ1 + γ2)
σξ1(t)2
Σδ(t)2
) 1
3
(5.12)
are asymptotically optimal (up to stopping) and clear the market. This formula is very similar to
the leading-order optimal no-trade region of Lo et al. [48, Theorem 4]. The only changes concern
powers and constants,25 and the different way through which interest rates enter.26
Using Lemma A.9, the leading-order trading volume corresponding to the policies (5.12) can
be readily computed in closed form as
||ϕˆ1T ||+ ||ϕˆ2T || =
∫ T
0
(
128
3
(γ1 + γ2)At
ε
σξ1(t)4
Σδ(t)
) 1
3
dt+ o(ε−
1
3 ),
where the convergence is to be understood in probability. Again, up to a change of powers and
constant, and a different role of the interest rate, this formula displays the same comparative
statics as the leading-order result of [48].27
A Proofs for Individual Optimality
This section contains the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 concerning asymptotically optimal policies
with small transaction costs for individual investors. To this end, we compare an explicit candidate
strategy/consumption pair (Theorem 3.2) or candidate consumption rate (Theorem 3.4) with
an explicit dual upper bound. Such a convex duality approach for asymptotic verification was
first used in a Mathematical Finance context by [33], and has recently been brought to bear on
models with small transaction costs in [39, 1]. Here, we extend their analysis to random and
time-varying transactions costs, intermediate consumption, dividends, and non-constant interest
rates (as required for general equilibrium modeling). In doing so, we also weaken the required
integrability conditions on the primitives of the model.
25This difference is due to the different transaction costs used, which are proportional in our model but fixed in
[48]. Compare [4] for a detailed discussion.
26This difference arises because the equilibrium price in [48] is constant, whereas it is diffusive in our model.
27To obtain a formula for leading-order trading volume in their model, multiply the inverse of the approximate
waiting time [48, Equation (30)] between successive trades with the corresponding trade size, which is given by the
halfwidth of the no-trade region from [48, Theorem 4].
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A.1 A Sufficient Condition for Frictionless Optimality
For the convenience of the reader, we first recall the well-known first-order condition for frictionless
optimality:
Lemma A.1. Fix ϕˆ0 ∈ R and let (Yt)t∈[0,T ] be a cumulative endowment process. If there are
(ϕˆ, cˆ) ∈ A∗(ϕˆ0, Y ) with E
[∫ T
0
|Ut(cˆt)| ν(dt)
]
< ∞ and a positive square-integrable martingale
(Zˆt)t∈[0,T ] such that the density dQˆ = ZˆTZˆ0 dP defines an equivalent martingale measure for S,
ϕˆ • S is a Qˆ-martingale, and
U ′t(cˆt) =
Zˆt
Bt
, t ∈ [0, T ], (A.1)
then (ϕˆ, cˆ) is optimal for (3.2).
Proof. Let (ϕ, c) ∈ A(ϕˆ0, Y ) with E
[∫ T
0
U−t (ct) ν(dt)
]
<∞ be a competing strategy/consumption
pair. Then using successively concavity of U , the first-order condition (A.1), Bayes’ theorem as in
[34, Corollary A.2(a)] (this requires the square integrability of Zˆ since consumptions streams are
typically not nonnegative here), the budget constraint (2.6) for c and cˆ (which is binding for cˆ),
the Qˆ-supermartingale property for ϕ • S and the Qˆ-martingale property for ϕˆ • S give
E
[∫ T
0
(Ut(ct)− Ut(cˆt)) ν(dt)
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
U ′t(cˆt)(ct − cˆt) ν(dt)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
Zˆt
(
ct
Bt
− cˆt
Bt
)
ν(dt)
]
= Zˆ0E
Qˆ
[∫ T
0
(
ct
Bt
− cˆt
Bt
)
ν(dt)
]
≤ Zˆ0EQˆ [ϕ • ST + YT − (ϕˆ • ST + YT )]
= Zˆ0E
Qˆ [ϕ • ST − ϕˆ • ST ] ≤ 0.
Hence, (ϕˆ, cˆ) is optimal as claimed.
A.2 Assumptions on the Primitives
To control the remainder terms in the asymptotic expansions of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4, we need to
assume that the primitives of the models are sufficiently integrable. The validity of these technical
regularity conditions is verified for the concrete model of Section 5 in Appendix C.3. To formulate
these assumptions succinctly, we introduce – for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and a generic measure Q ≈ P – the
following sets:
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X iN (Q) :=
{(
µϕˆ
i,Q∆ϕi
Σϕˆi
)∗
T
,
(
µ∆ϕ
i,Q∆ϕi
Σϕˆi
)∗
T
,
(
Σ∆ϕ
i
Σϕˆi
)∗
T
}
,
XE(Q) :=
{
(E∗T )
4,
(
(E−1)∗T
)4}
,
X∆ϕi(Q) :=
{
|µϕˆi,Q| • IT , |µ∆ϕi,Q| • IT ,∆ϕi|µE,Q| • IT , ((∆ϕi)2ΣE • IT )1/2,
Σϕˆ
i
∆ϕi
• IT ,
Σ∆ϕ
i
∆ϕi
• IT ,Σ
ϕˆi • IT ,Σ
∆ϕi • IT ,Σ
E • IT ,
E
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i
• IT
}
,
Xϕˆi(Q) :=
{
(ϕˆi + 1)|µS,Q| • IT ,
(
((ϕˆi)2 + 1)ΣS • IT
)1/2}
.
Theorem 3.2 for the agents trading the risky asset is valid under the following assumptions:
Assumption A.2. Fix i ∈ {1, 2} and `i ∈ R. Assume that XNi(Qˆi) ⊂ L1(Qˆi) , X∆ϕi(Qˆi),
XE(Qˆi) ⊂ L1+κ(Qˆi) and Xϕˆi(P ) ∈ L2(P ) for some κ > 0, where Qˆi is the frictionless dual
martingale measure for Agent i. Moreover, suppose that
EQˆ
i
[
exp
(
2(γi)2
(
2 +
κ
2
+
2
κ
)2 (ϕˆi − `i)2
A2
ΣS • IT
)]
<∞. (A.2)
Finally, assume that µϕ
i,Qˆi , µ∆ϕ
i,Qˆi , and µE,Qˆ
i
are locally bounded.
The exponential moment condition (A.2) is required due to the exponential form of the utilities.
For Theorem 3.4 that treats Agent 3 (who receives the transaction costs paid by Agents 1 and 2
and consumes them optimally), we additionally need the following:28
Assumption A.3. Assume that XN1(Qˆ3),XN2(Qˆ3),X∆ϕ1(Qˆ3),X∆ϕ2(Qˆ3) ⊂ L1(Qˆ3), where Qˆ3
is the frictionless equivalent martingale measure for Agent 3.
A.3 Normalized Strategy Correction and an Ergodic Result
Fix i ∈ {1, 2}. For ε > 0, define the normalized strategy correction
N i,ε =
∆ϕi,ε
ε
1
3 ∆ϕi
. (A.3)
Note that by definition, N i,ε takes values in [−1, 1] and the positive and negative variations ϕi,ε↑
and ϕi,ε↓ of ϕi,ε only move on {N i,ε = −1} and {N i,ε = 1}, respectively.
For small ε, the reflected Itô process N i,ε can be approximated by a reflected Brownian motion
at the leading order. N i,εt in turn converges weakly to the uniform law on [−1, 1] with variance
1/3 as ε ↓ 0. This underlies the following ergodic result which is a straightforward generalisation
of [1, Lemma 4.3.4]. It plays an important role in the computation of the primal and dual bounds
in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
28In equilibrium, ϕˆ1 + ϕˆ2 = 1 and ∆ϕ1 = ∆ϕ2 imply XN1 (Qˆ3) = XN2 (Qˆ3) and X∆ϕ2 (Qˆ3) = X∆ϕ1 (Qˆ3).
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Lemma A.4. Let Q ≈ P , and suppose that XNi(Q) ⊂ L1(Q). Let p ≥ 1 and (Kt)t∈[0,T ] a
continuous adapted process satisfying EQ
[
(
∫ T
0
|Kt|dt)p
]
<∞. Then:
lim
ε↓0
∥∥∥∥∫ ·
0
(N i,εs )
2Ks ds− 1
3
∫ ·
0
Ks ds
∥∥∥∥
Sp(Q)
= 0. (A.4)
(The definition of the semimartingale norm Sp(Q) is recalled in Definition E.1.)
Proof. The difference to [1, Lemma 4.3.4] is that we assume EQ[(
∫ T
0
|Kt|dt)p] < ∞ rather than
EQ[
∫ T
0
|Kt|dt] <∞ to derive convergence in Sp(Q) instead of convergence in S1(Q). [1, Lemma
4.3.4] first establishes convergence of supt∈[0,T ]
∣∣(N i,ε)2K • It − 13K • It∣∣ to 0 in probability as
ε ↓ 0. It is then shown that ∫ T
0
|Kt|dt (times a constant) is an almost-sure upper bound. By the
dominated convergence theorem, the convergence in probability can thus be lifted to convergence
in Lp(Q) for p ≥ 1 if EQ[(∫ T
0
|Kt|dt)p] <∞ as is assumed here.
A.4 Stopping the Normalised Transaction Costs
Before proceeding to the other estimates, we stop the normalized transaction costs E. This allows
to treat them “almost as constant” in many of the estimates below. Moreover, this yields uniform
higher-order bound on the transaction costs incurred by liquidating any admissible strategy at
any stopping time.
Lemma A.5. Fix κ > 0. For ε > 0, define the stopping time
τEε = inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : max (Et,E−1t ) > ε− 16 (1− 13 κ1+κ )} ∧ T. (A.5)
Let Q ≈ P and suppose that XE ⊂ L1+κ(Q). Then
lim
ε↓0
ε−
2
3 (1+
κ
2 )Q[τEε < T ] = 0. (A.6)
Proof. Define the stopping times τE,1ε = inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : Et > ε− 16 (1− 13 κ1+κ )
}
∧ T and τE,2ε =
inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : E−1t > ε−
1
6 (1− 13 κ1+κ )
}
∧ T . Then τEε = τE,1ε ∧ τE,2ε and it suffices to show
lim
ε↓0
ε−
2
3 (1+
κ
2 )Qˆ[τE,jε < T ] = 0, for j ∈ {1, 2}. (A.7)
For j = 1, set Kε := E and L := E. Then the claim follows from Lemma E.7(a) with p = 4(1 +κ),
q = 0, and r = − 16 (1− 13 κ1+κ ) under the stated integrability assumptions. The case j = 2 is proved
analogously.
Lemma A.6. Let Qˆ be an equivalent local martingale measure for S, ϕ any εi-admissible strategy,
and `i ∈ R. Let (τε)ε>0 be a family of stopping times with τε ≤ τEε , for each ε > 0. Then:
EQˆ
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
εαiEt∧τε |ϕt∧τε − `i|
]
= o(ε
2
3 ).
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Proof. The definition of τEε implies supt∈[0,T ] εEt∧τε ≤ ε1−
1
6 (1− 13 κ1+κ ) = ε
5
6 (1+
1
15
κ
1+κ ). Thus, it
suffices to show EQˆ
[
supt∈[0,T ] εEt∧τε |ϕt∧τε |
]
= o(ε
2
3 ). By definition of τEε ,
Et∧τε ≤ ε−
1
6 (1− 13 κ1+κ ) ≤ ε− 16 (1− 13 κ1+κ ) ε
− 16 (1− 13 κ1+κ )
maxu∈[0,τε] E
−1
u
= ε−
1
3 (1− 13 κ1+κ ) min
u∈[0,τε]
Eu.
Now using that EQˆ
[
minu∈[0,τε] Eu|ϕu∧τε |
] ≤ EQˆ [E0ϕ0 + ∫(0,T ] Et d‖ϕ‖t] <∞ by (2.8), we obtain
EQˆ
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
εEt∧τε |ϕt∧τε |
]
≤ ε 23 (1+ 16 κ1+κ )EQˆ
[
E0ϕ0 +
∫
(0,T ]
Et d‖ϕ‖t
]
= o(ε
2
3 ).
This completes the proof.
A.5 Adjustment Process and a First Limit Theorem
For the computation of both the primal lower and dual upper bounds, a crucial role is played
by a shadow price process. This is a fictitious price process that evolves in the bid-ask spread of
the market with transaction costs, but does not lead to more favorable terms of trade because it
coincides with the bid or ask price whenever the (asymptotically) optimal strategy prescribes to
sell or buy stocks, respectively, compare [16, 47, 40].
In the present context, the deviation of the shadow price from the midprice will be described
by the following additive adjustment process (this parametrization in terms of N i,ε from (A.3) is
derived heuristically in [41]; it is also used in [39, 1]):
∆Si,εt :=
1
2
εαiEt
(
(N i,εt )
3 − 3N i,εt
)
. (A.8)
Itô’s formula readily yields the corresponding dynamics:
Proposition A.7. For each ε > 0, ∆Si,ε is an Itô process with values in [−εαiE, εαiE] and
d∆Si,εt = −
3
2
ε
2
3
αiEt
∆ϕit
(
(N i,εt )
2 − 1)dϕˆit
− 3
2
ε
αiEt
∆ϕit
N i,εt
(
(N i,εt )
2 − 1) d∆ϕit + 12εαi ((N i,εt )3 − 3N i,εt ) dEt
+
3
2
ε
1
3
αiEt
(∆ϕit)
2
N i,εt d〈ϕˆi〉t
+
3
2
ε
2
3
αiEt
(∆ϕit)
2
(
(N i,εt )
2 + 1
)
d〈ϕˆi,∆ϕi〉t − 3
2
ε
2
3
αi
∆ϕit
(
(N i,εt )
2 − 1) d〈ϕˆi,E〉t
+
3
2
ε
αiEt
(∆ϕit)
2
N i,εt
(
2(N i,εt )
2 − 1) d〈∆ϕi〉t − 3
2
εαi
N i,εt
∆ϕit
(
(N i,εt )
2 − 1)d〈∆ϕi,E〉t. (A.9)
The next result uses the adjustment process to compute the (normalised) transaction costs∫ ·
0
ε
1
3αiEs d‖ϕi,ε‖s generated by the candidate strategy ϕi,ε until the normalized transaction cost
E is stopped:29
29Lemma A.8 extends [1, Lemma 4.3.2] in two directions. First, the convergence is in S1+κ rather than S1, and
more importantly, due to the stopping the estimates are often of order ε
1
6 lower than in [1, Lemma 4.3.2].
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Lemma A.8. Let Q ≈ P , κ > 0 and assume that X∆ϕi ⊂ L1+κ(Q). Then:
lim
ε↓0
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ ·∧τEε
0
ε
1
3αiEs d‖ϕi,ε‖s − 3
2
∫ ·∧τEε
0
(
1− 2(N i,εs )2
) αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
∥∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Q)
= 0. (A.10)
Proof. Recall that ϕi,ε↑ only moves on {N i,ε = −1} = {∆Si,ε = εαiE}, and ϕi,ε↓ only moves on
{N i,ε = 1} = {∆Si,ε = −εαiE}. As a consequence,
εαiE • ‖ϕi,ε‖ = εαiE • ϕi,ε↑ + εαiE • ϕi,ε↓ = εαiE • ϕi,ε↑ − (−εαiE) • ϕi,ε↓
= ∆Si,ε • ϕi,ε↑ −∆Si,ε • ϕi,ε↓ = ∆Si,ε • ϕi,ε. (A.11)
Next, add and subtract ∆Si,ε • ϕˆi and integrate by parts. Recalling that ϕi,ε − ϕˆi = ∆ϕi,ε,
∆ϕi,ε0 = 0, and ϕ
i,ε is continuous and of finite variation, this yields
∆Si,ε • ϕi,ε = ∆Si,ε • ϕˆi + ∆Si,ε • (ϕi,ε − ϕˆi)
= ∆Si,ε • ϕˆi + ∆Si,ε(ϕi,ε − ϕˆi)− (ϕi,ε − ϕˆi) • ∆Si,ε − 〈ϕi,ε − ϕˆi,∆Si,ε〉
= ∆Si,ε • ϕˆi + ∆Si,ε∆ϕi,ε −∆ϕi,ε • ∆Si,ε + 〈ϕˆi,∆Si,ε〉. (A.12)
We proceed by estimating each summand on the right-hand side of (A.12) on J0, τEε K. In doing so,
we use Proposition A.7, that ∆Si,ε is [−εαiE, εαiE]-valued, E ≤ ε− 16 on J0, τEε K, |∆ϕi,ε| ≤ ε 13 ∆ϕi,
|N i,ε| ≤ 1 and apply Lemma E.4 (with the universal constant Cp). Together with the stated
integrability assumptions (using also the inequality |ΣX.Y | ≤ 12 (ΣX + ΣY ) for Itô processes X and
Y ), this gives∥∥∥(∆Si,ε • ϕˆi)τEε ∥∥∥
S1+κ(Q)
≤ ε 56αiCp
∥∥ϕˆi∥∥H1+κ(Q) = O(ε 56 ), (A.13)∥∥∆Si,ε∆ϕi,ε1J0,τEε K∥∥S1+κ(Q) ≤ ε 76αiCp (∣∣∆ϕi0∣∣+ ∥∥∆ϕi∥∥H1+κ(Q)) = O(ε7/6), (A.14)
as well as∥∥∥∥∥
(
−∆ϕi,ε • ∆Si,ε + 3
2
ε
2
3 (N i,ε)2
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
• I
)τEε ∥∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Q)
≤ 3
2
ε
5
6αiCp
∥∥ϕˆi∥∥H1+κ(Q)
+
3
2
ε
7
6αiCp
∥∥∆ϕi∥∥H1+κ(Q) + ε4/3αiCp ∥∥∆ϕi • E∥∥H1+κ(Q)
+ 3ε
5
6αi
∥∥∥∥ 1∆ϕi • 〈ϕˆi,∆ϕi〉
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Q)
+
3
2
εαi
∥∥〈ϕˆi,E〉∥∥S1+κ(Q)
+
3
2
ε
7
6αi
∥∥∥∥ 1∆ϕi • 〈∆ϕi〉
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Q)
+
3
2
ε4/3αi
∥∥〈∆ϕi,E〉∥∥S1+κ(Q) = O(ε 56 ), (A.15)
and ∥∥∥∥∥
(
〈ϕˆi,∆Si,ε〉+ 3
2
ε
2
3
(
(N i,εs )
2 − 1) αiE
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i
• I
)τEε ∥∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Q)
≤ 3
2
ε
5
6αi
∥∥∥∥ 1∆ϕi • 〈ϕˆi,∆ϕi〉
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Q)
+ εαi
∥∥〈ϕˆi,E〉∥∥S1+κ(Q) = O(ε 56 ). (A.16)
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The assertion now follows by combining (A.11) – (A.16).
Together with Lemma A.4 and dominated convergence, Lemma A.8 yields the following formula
for the (normalised) transaction costs generated by the candidate strategy ϕi,ε:
Lemma A.9. Let Q ≈ P , κ > 0, and assume that XNi ⊂ L1(Q) and X∆ϕi ⊂ L1+κ(Q). Then:
lim
ε↓0
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ ·∧τEε
0
ε
1
3αiEt d‖ϕi,ε‖s − 1
2
∫ ·
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
∥∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Q)
= 0. (A.17)
A.6 Primal Stopping
We now introduce auxiliary stopping times at which the candidate strategy ϕi,ε is liquidated to a
static position `i ∈ R. This technical modification is needed to control the direct transaction costs
(directly due to the trading friction) and the indirect transaction costs (due to displacement from
the frictionless optimizer) by a small but positive power of ε. This will be a crucial element for
the proof of the asymptotic expansion in Theorem 3.2. First, we stop the direct transaction costs:
Lemma A.10. Fix κ > 0 and `i ∈ R. For ε > 0, define the stopping time
τ i,Dε := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∫ t
0
εαiEu d‖ϕi,ε‖u + εαiEt|ϕi,εt − `i| > αiε
2
9
κ
1+κ
}
∧ τEε . (A.18)
Let Q ≈ P and suppose that XNi ⊂ L1(Q) and X∆ϕi ⊂ L1+κ(Q). Then:
lim
ε↓0
ε−
2
3 (1+
κ
2 )Q[τ i,Dε < T ] = 0. (A.19)
Proof. Define τ i,D,1ε := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : ∫ t
0
εαiEu1J0,τEε K d‖ϕi,ε‖u > 12αiε 29 κ1+κ
}
∧ T and τ i,D,2ε :=
inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : εαiEt∧τEε |ϕ
i,ε
t∧τEε − `
i| > 12αiε
2
9
κ
1+κ
}
∧ T . As τ i,Dε ≥ τ i,D,1ε ∧ τ i,D,2ε ∧ τE, by (A.7),
it suffices to show that, for j ∈ {1, 2},
lim
ε↓0
ε−
2
3 (1+
κ
2 )Q[τ i,D,jε < T ] = 0. (A.20)
For j = 1, set Kε,1 := ε
1
3αiE1J0,τEε K • ‖ϕi,ε‖ and L1 := 12 αiE∆ϕiΣϕˆi • I. Then (A.20) for j = 1
follows from Lemma E.7(b) with p = 1 + κ, q = 2/3, and r = 29
κ
1+κ and Lemma A.9 under the
stated integrability assumptions.
For j = 2, set Kε,2 := ε
1
3E·∧τEε α
i|ϕi,ε·∧τEε − `
i| and L2 := αi(|ϕˆi| + |∆ϕi| + |`i|). Then (A.20)
for j = 2 follows from Lemma E.7(a) with p = 1 + κ, q = 23 , r =
2
9
κ
1+κ and Lemma E.4 under the
stated integrability assumptions.
Next, we stop the indirect transaction costs:
Lemma A.11. Fix κ > 0. For ε > 0, define the stopping time
τ i,Iε := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
∆ϕi,εu dSu
∣∣∣∣ > ε 19 κ1+κ} ∧ T. (A.21)
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Let Qˆ be an equivalent local martingale measure for S and EQˆ
[(∫ T
0
Et
∆ϕit
Σϕˆ
i
t dt
)1+κ]
<∞. Then:
lim
ε↓0
ε−
2
3 (1+
κ
2 )Qˆ[τ i,Iε < T ] = 0. (A.22)
Proof. Set Kε := ε−1/3∆ϕi,ε • S and L := 32
A
γi
αiE
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i
• I. Then, using that |∆ϕi,ε| ≤ ε 13 ∆ϕi
and the definition (3.6) of ∆ϕi, we obtain
[Kε] ≤ (∆ϕi)2ΣS • I = (∆ϕi)3 Σ
S
∆ϕi
• I = L.
Since A is uniformly bounded from above by A0, the claim now follows from Lemma E.7(c) with
p = 2(1 + κ), q = 1/3, and r = 19
κ
1+κ under the stated integrability assumption.
We can now define the “primal stopping time” used in the definition of the candidate optimal
consumption pair in Theorem 3.2.
Definition A.12. Let `i ∈ R and κ > 0. Then the primal stopping time is defined as
τˆ iε := τ
i,D
ε ∧ τ i,Iε > 0, (A.23)
where τ i,Dε is defined in (A.18) and τ i,Iε is defined in (A.21).
A.7 Dual Stopping
To obtain a dual upper bound, we now construct a shadow price Sˆi,ε and a corresponding dual
martingale Z
i,ε
(the density process of the corresponding dual minimizer relative to the frictionless
marginal pricing measure Qˆi). A candidate for the shadow price is the process
Si,ε := S + ∆Si,ε,
which takes values in the bid-ask spread by construction. Similarly as in [39], to derive a candidate
for the dual martingale we proceed as follows: we first write
Si,ε = µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi • I + σ∆S
i,ε
•W δ,Qˆ
i
+ Si,ε⊥,
where µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi denotes the Qˆi-drift of Si,ε, σ∆S
i,ε
denotes the “S-hedgeable” volatility component
relative to the Qˆi-Brownian motion W δ,Qˆ
i
driving S under Qˆi, and Si,ε⊥ is a local Qˆi-martingale
orthogonal to W δ,Qˆ
i
. Note that σ∆S
i,ε
= Σ
S+Σ∆S
i,ε,S√
ΣS
and write
λi,ε :=
µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
σ∆Si,ε
=
µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
√
ΣS
ΣS + Σ∆Si,ε,S
for the adjustment market price of risk (under Qˆi). In view of Girsanov’s theorem, we would then
like to use
Z
i,ε
:=
(
−λi,ε •W δ,Qˆi
)
.
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as a dual martingale density. However, in order to guarantee that λi,ε is well defined (the denom-
inator could become zero) and to ensure enough integrability of Z
i,ε
for our asymptotic analysis,
some additional stopping is necessary. We first control the adjustment market price of risk:
Lemma A.13. For ε > 0, define the stopping time
τ i,λε = τ
i,λ,1
ε ∧ τ i,λ,2ε ∧ τ i,λ,3ε ∧ τ i,λ,4ε ,
where
τ i,λ,1ε = inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∣∣∣∣∣Σ∆S
i,ε,S
t
ΣSt
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε 13
}
∧ T, (A.24)
τ i,λ,2ε = inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∣∣∣∣32ε 13 αiEt(∆ϕit)2N i,εt Σ
ϕˆi
t√
ΣSt
∣∣∣∣ > ε 16
}
∧ T, (A.25)
τ i,λ,3ε = inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∣∣∣∣µ∆Si,ε,Qˆit√
ΣSt
− 3
2
ε
1
3
αiEt
(∆ϕit)
2
N i,εt
Σϕˆ
i
t√
ΣSt
∣∣∣∣ > ε 13
}
∧ T, (A.26)
τ i,λ,4ε = inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∣∣∣∣
(
µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
t
)2
ΣSt
A
γi
− 3
2
ε
2
3
αiE
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i
(N i,ε)2
∣∣∣∣ > ε 56
}
∧ T. (A.27)
Assume that µϕ
i,Qˆi , µ∆ϕ
i,Qˆi , and µE,Qˆ
i
are locally bounded. Then:
lim
ε↓0
Qˆi[τ i,λε < T ] = 0. (A.28)
Proof. It suffices to show that for j ∈ {1, . . . , 4},
lim
ε↓0
Qˆi[τ i,λ,jε < T ] = 0. (A.29)
To this end, set
Kε,1 := ε−
2
3
(
Σ∆S
i,ε,S
t
ΣSt
)
,
Kε,2 := ε−
1
3
(
3
2
ε
1
3
αiE
(∆ϕi)2
N i,ε
Σϕˆ
i
√
ΣS
)
,
Kε,3 = ε−
2
3
(
µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
t√
ΣSt
− 3
2
ε
1
3
αiEt
(∆ϕit)
2
N i,εt
Σϕˆ
i
t√
ΣSt
)
,
Kε,4 = ε−1
((
µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
t
)2
ΣSt
A
γi
− 3
2
ε
2
3
αiE
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i
(N i,ε)2
)
.
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Recalling the dynamics (A.9) of ∆Si,ε and the bound |N i,ε| ≤ 1 gives for ε ∈ (0, 1),
|Kε,1| ≤ 3
2
αiEt
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i,S
ΣS
+
3
2
αiE
∆ϕi
Σ∆ϕ
i,S
ΣS
+ αi
ΣE,S
ΣS
=: L1,
|Kε,2| ≤ 3
2
αiE
(∆ϕi)2
Σϕˆ
i
√
ΣS
:= L2,
|Kε,3| ≤ 3
2
αiE
∆ϕi
|µϕˆi,Qˆi |√
ΣS
+
3
2
αiE
∆ϕi
|µ∆ϕi,Qˆi |√
ΣS
+ αi
|µE,Qˆi |√
ΣS
+ 3
αiE
(∆ϕi)2
|Σϕˆi,∆ϕi |√
ΣS
+
3
2
αi
∆ϕi
|Σϕˆi,E|√
ΣS
+
3
2
αiE
(∆ϕi)2
Σ∆ϕ
i
√
ΣS
+
3
2
αi
∆ϕi
|Σ∆ϕi,E|√
ΣS
=: L3
Now, note hat
Kε,3 = ε−1/3
(
ε−1/3
µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
√
ΣS
−Kε,2
)
, (Kε,2)2 =
3
2
γi
A
(N i,ε)2
αiE
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i
,
and use the identity a2 − b2 = (a− b)(a− b+ 2b), obtaining
|Kε,4| = ε− 13 A
γi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ε− 23 (µ∆Si,ε√
ΣS
)2
− (Kε,2)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ε−
1
3
A
γi
∣∣∣ε 13Kε,3 (ε 13Kε,3 + 2Kε,2)∣∣∣
≤ A
γi
|Kε,3| (|Kε,3|+ 2|Kε,2|)
≤ A
γi
L3(L3 + 2L2) := L4,
for ε ∈ (0, 1). As L1, . . . , L4 do not depend on ε and are locally bounded, this together with the
definitions of τ i,λ,jε gives (A.29) for j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.
With the notation from Lemma A.13, define the (stopped) adjustment market price of risk by
λi,ε =
µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
√
ΣS
ΣS + Σ∆Si,ε,S
1J0,τ i,λε K, ε > 0. (A.30)
The integrability ensured by stopping allows to establish the following ergodic theorem, which will
be used in the dual considerations of the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma A.14. Fix κ > 0 and suppose XNi(Qˆi) ⊂ L1(Qˆi) andEQˆi
[(∫ T
0
Et
∆ϕit
Σϕˆ
i
t dt
)1+κ]
< ∞.
Then:
lim
ε↓0
∥∥∥∥∫ ·
0
ε−
2
3 (λi,εs )
2As
γi
ds− 1
2
∫ ·
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Qˆi)
= 0. (A.31)
Proof. Set λ˜i,ε = µ
∆Si,ε,Qˆi
√
ΣS
1J0,τ i,λε K. It suffices to show (A.31) with λi,ε replaced by λ˜i,ε. Indeed,
(A.31) with λi,ε replaced by λ˜i,ε implies that
lim
ε↓0
∥∥∥∥∫ ·
0
ε−
2
3 (λ˜i,εs )
2As
γi
ds
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Qˆi)
=
∥∥∥∥12
∫ ·
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Qˆi)
<∞.
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Moreover, by the definition of τ i,λ,1ε ,
|λ˜i,ε| = |λi,ε|
∣∣∣∣∣ΣS + Σ∆S
i,ε,S
ΣS
∣∣∣∣∣ ∈ |λi,ε|(1− ε 13 , 1 + ε 13) .
Thus, for ε ∈ (0, 18 ), we have
∣∣∣(λ˜i,ε)2 − (λi,ε)2∣∣∣ ≤ 3ε 13 (λi,ε)2 ≤ 6ε 13 (λ˜i,ε)2, and in turn
lim sup
ε↓0
∥∥∥∥∫ ·
0
ε−
2
3 (λ˜i,εs )
2As
γi
ds−
∫ ·
0
ε−
2
3 (λi,εs )
2As
γi
ds
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Qˆi)
≤ lim
ε↓0
6ε
1
3
∥∥∥∥∫ ·
0
ε−
2
3 (λ˜i,εs )
2As
γi
ds
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Qˆi)
= 0.
Next, it follows from dominated convergence (using Lemma A.13) and Lemma A.4 that
lim
ε↓0
∥∥∥∥32
∫ ·
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s (N
i,ε
s )
21J0,τ i,λε K ds− 12
∫ ·
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Qˆi)
.
Thus, it suffices to show that
lim
ε↓0
∥∥∥∥∫ ·
0
ε−
2
3 (λ˜i,εs )
2As
γi
ds− 3
2
∫ ·
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s (N
i,ε
s )
21J0,τ i,λε K ds
∥∥∥∥
S1+κ(Qˆi)
= 0. (A.32)
By definition of τ i,λ,4ε , it follows that∣∣∣∣ε− 23 (λ˜i,ε)2 Aγi − 32 αiE∆ϕiΣϕˆi(N i,ε)21J0,τ i,λε K
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε 16 .
Now (A.32) follows from dominated convergence.
By a further stopping argument, we can ensure that the stochastic exponential of the (stopped)
adjustment market price of risk is uniformly close to 1. This is exploited in Lemmas A.17 and
A.18 below.
Lemma A.15. For ε > 0, define the stopping time
τ i,∆Zε := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∣∣∣E (λi,ε •W δ,Qˆi)− 1∣∣∣ > 1
2
ε
1
12
}
∧ T.
Then:
lim
ε↓0
Qˆi[τ i,∆Zε < T ] = 0. (A.33)
Proof. Define the stopping times τ i,∆Z,1ε := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
∣∣∣λi,ε •W δ,Qˆit ∣∣∣ > 18ε 112}∧T and τ i,∆Z,2ε :=
inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : ∫ t
0
(λi,εu )
2 du > 14ε
1
6
}
∧ T . Then by definition of the stochastic exponential and the
inequality | exp(x) − 1| ≤ 2|x| for x ∈ (−∞, 1), we have τ i,∆Zε ≤ τ i,∆Z,1ε ∧ τ i,∆Z,2ε for ε ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, it suffices to show for j ∈ {1, 2} that
lim
ε↓0
Qˆi[τ i,∆Z,jε < T ] = 0. (A.34)
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To this end, note that by definition of τ i,λ,1ε , τ i,λ,2ε , and τ i,λ,3ε , for ε ∈ (0, 18 ),
|λi,ε| =
∣∣∣∣∣µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
√
ΣS
∣∣∣∣∣
/ ∣∣∣∣∣1 + Σ∆S
i,ε,S
ΣS
∣∣∣∣∣1J0,τ i,λε K ≤ 11− ε 13
∣∣∣∣∣µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
√
ΣS
∣∣∣∣∣1J0,τ i,λε K
≤ 2
(∣∣∣∣∣µ∆S
i,ε,Qˆi
√
ΣS
− 3
2
ε
1
3
αiE
(∆ϕi)2
N i,ε
Σϕˆ
i
√
ΣS
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣32ε 13 αiE(∆ϕi)2N i,ε Σϕˆ
i
√
ΣS
∣∣∣∣∣
)
1J0,τ i,λε K
≤ 2(ε 13 + ε 16 ) ≤ 4ε 16 . (A.35)
Set Kε,1 := ε−
1
6 (λi,ε • W δ,Qˆ
i
) and Kε,2 := ε−
1
3 ((λi,ε)2 • I), and define L1 = L2 := 16I. Then by
(A.35), [Kε,1] ≤ L1 and |K2,ε| ≤ L2 for ε ∈ (0, 18 ). As (L1)∗T = (L2)∗T = 16T has moments of all
orders, (A.34) for j = 1, 2 follows from Lemma E.7(a) and (b).
We can now define the “dual stopping time” used in the definition of the shadow price Sˆi,ε and
the dual martingale Z
i,ε
below.
Definition A.16. Let κ > 0. Then the “dual stopping time” is defined as
τ˜ iε := τ
i,λ
ε ∧ τ i,∆Zε ∧ τEε , ε > 0. (A.36)
A.8 Shadow Price and Dual Martingale
For ε > 0, define
∆Sˆi,ε := (∆Si,ε)τ˜
i
ε ,
Sˆi,ε := S + ∆Sˆi,ε,
Z
i,ε
= E
(
−λi,ε1J0,τ˜ iεK •W δ,Qˆi
)
,
∆Zˆi,ε := Z
i,ε − 1.
By definition of τ i,∆Zε and τ i,∆Zε ≤ τ˜ iε, Z
i,ε
and ∆Zˆi,ε are bounded Qˆ-martingales and
|∆Zˆi,ε| ≤ 1
2
ε
1
12 . (A.37)
Girsanov’s theorem shows that Sˆi,ε is a local Qˆi,ε-martingale under the measure with density
dQˆi,ε = Z
i,ε
T dQˆ
i. This measure will serve as the dual element leading to an upper bound for the
asymptotic expansion in the proof of Theorem 3.2
The “shadow price” Sˆi,ε is guaranteed to take values in the bid-ask spread only until the dual
stopping time τ˜ iε.30 Nevertheless, it can be used to bound frictional gains processes by their
frictionless counterparts – up to a liquidation term of higher order:
Lemma A.17. Let ϕ be any εi-admissible strategy . Then ϕ ∈ L(Sˆi,ε) and∫ t
0
ϕu dSu −
∫ t
0
εαiEu d‖ϕ‖u ≤
∫ t
0
ϕu dSˆ
i,ε
u + α
iεEτ˜ε∧t|ϕτ˜ε∧t|, t ∈ [0, T ]. (A.38)
30Note that the shadow price does not depend on the primal stopping time τˆ iε. This is different from the analysis
in [1, 39].
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Moreover, ϕ • Sˆi,ε is a Qˆi,ε-supermartingale and
EQˆ
i,ε
[∫ T
0
ϕu dSu −
∫ T
0
εαiEu d‖ϕ‖u
]
≤ o(ε 23 ). (A.39)
Proof. As any εi-admissible strategy is of finite variation, it is integrable with respect to any
semimartingale, and so in particular with respect to Sˆi,ε.
Fix t ∈ [0, T ]. An integration by parts,31 ∆Si,ε0 = 0 and ∆Si,ε ∈ [−εαiE, εαiE] yield∫ t
0
ϕu d∆Sˆ
i,ε
u =
∫ t∧τ˜ε
0
ϕu d∆S
i,ε
u = ϕt∧τ˜ iε∆S
i,ε
t∧τ˜ iε − ϕ0∆S
i,ε
0 −
∫ t∧τ˜ iε
0
∆Si,εu dϕu
≥ −εαiEτ˜ iε∧t|ϕτ˜ iε∧t| −
∫ t
0
εαiEu d‖ϕ‖u. (A.40)
Adding
∫ t
0
ϕu dSu and rearranging therefore gives (A.38).
To establish that ϕ • Sˆi,ε is a Qˆi,ε-supermartingale, by [25, Proposition 2.2] it suffices to show
that (ϕ • Si,ε)− = max(−ϕ • Si,ε, 0) is of class D under Qˆi,ε. As dQˆi,ε
dQˆi
= Z
i,ε
T is bounded, it
suffices to show that it is of class D under Qˆi. (A.38) implies that
(ϕ • Si,ε)− ≤ εαiEτ˜ε∧t|ϕτ˜ε∧t|+ (ϕ • S − εαiE • ‖ϕ‖)−. (A.41)
By Lemma A.6, the first term on the right-hand side of (A.41) is of classD. The second term is also
of class D because ϕ • S − εαiE • ‖ϕ‖ is a Qˆi-supermartingale (this uses that ϕ is εi-admissible).
As processes of class D form a vector space, this shows that ϕ • Sˆi,ε is a Qˆi,ε-supermartingale.
Together with (A.38) and Lemma A.6, this gives (A.39).
We next compute the expectation of the frictionless gains ϕˆi • ST under the dual martingale
measure Qˆi,ε:
Lemma A.18. Assume that XNi ⊂ L1(Qˆi) and X∆ϕi ⊂ L1(Qˆi). Then:
EQˆ
i,ε [
ϕˆi • ST
]
= ε
2
3 Zˆi0E
Qˆ
[∫ T
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ).
Proof. As S = Sˆi,ε −∆Sˆi,ε, it suffices to show that
EQˆ
i,ε
[
ϕˆi • Sˆi,εT
]
= 0 (A.42)
EQˆ
i,ε
[
ϕˆi • ∆Sˆi,εT
]
= −ε 23 Zˆi0EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ). (A.43)
In order to establish (A.42), it suffices to show that the local Qˆi,ε-martingale ϕˆi • Sˆi,ε is of class
D under Qˆi,ε and hence a true Qˆi,ε-martingale. As dQˆ
i,ε
dQˆi
= Z
i,ε
T is bounded, it suffices to show
that ϕˆi • Sˆi,ε is of class D under Qˆi. By definition of Sˆi,ε, an integration by parts (recall that ϕˆi
31As ϕ is làdlàg (because it is of finite variation), integration by parts is well defined, and as ∆Si,ε is continuous,
we need not consider left and right limits.
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is an Itô process) and a similar estimate as in (A.40), for t ∈ [0, T ], we obtain
|ϕˆi • Sˆi,εt | ≤ |ϕˆi • St|+ |ϕˆi • ∆Sˆi,εt |
≤ |ϕˆi • St|+ |ϕˆit∧τ˜ iε∆S
i,ε
t∧τ˜ iε |+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t∧τ˜ iε
0
∆Si,εu dϕˆ
i
u
∣∣∣∣∣ . (A.44)
It suffices to show that each summand on the right-hand side of (A.44) is of class D under Qˆi. For
the first summand this is trivial as it is the modulus of a (uniformly integrable) Qˆi-martingale.
For the second summand, using that ∆Si,ε ∈ [−εαiE, εαiE], E ≤ ε− 16 on J0, τEε K, τ˜ iε ≤ τEε and
Lemma E.4 (with the universal constant C1), this follows from
‖(ϕˆi∆Si,ε)τ˜ iε‖S1(Qˆi) ≤ ε
5
6αi‖ϕˆi‖S1(Qˆi) ≤ ε
5
6αiC1
(
|ϕˆi0|+ ‖ϕˆi‖H1(Qˆi)
)
<∞.
For the third summand, this follows from (A.13).
To establish (A.43), we first note that by Bayes’ theorem,
EQˆ
i,ε
[
ϕˆi • ∆Sˆi,εT
]
= EQˆ
i
[
(1 + ∆Zˆi,εT )(ϕˆ
i • ∆Sˆi,εT )
]
.
As |∆Zˆi,ε| ≤ 12ε
1
12 , it suffices to show that
EQˆ
i
[
ϕˆi • ∆Sˆi,εT
]
= −ε 23 Zˆi0EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ).
An integration by parts and ∆Sˆi,ε0 = 0 give
ϕˆi • ∆Sˆi,εT = ϕˆτ˜ iε∆S
i,ε
τ˜ iε
−∆Si,ε • ϕˆiτ˜ iε − 〈ϕˆ
i,∆Si,ε〉τ˜ iε . (A.45)
Now, take the Qˆi-expectation of each summand on the right-hand side of (A.45). Taking into
account Lemma A.6 and ∆Si,ε ∈ [−εαiE, εαiE], we obtain
EQˆ
i
[
ϕˆiτ˜ iε∆S
i,ε
τ˜ iε
]
= o(ε
2
3 ). (A.46)
Next, (A.13) and Jensen’s inequality imply
EQˆ
i
[
∆Si,ε • ϕˆiτ˜ iε
]
= O(ε
5
6 ). (A.47)
Finally, by (A.16), Lemma E.2, and Lemma A.4:
EQˆ
i [〈ϕˆi,∆Si,ε〉τ˜ iε] = −EQˆi [32ε 23 ((N i,εs )2 − 1) αiE∆ϕiΣϕˆi • IT
]
+O(ε)
= ε
2
3EQˆ
i
[
αiE
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i
• IT
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ). (A.48)
Putting (A.46) – (A.48) together yields (A.43).
We now compute the expected discounted square of the dual martingale correction ∆Zˆi,εt . This
is used in the proof of Theorem 3.2 to compute the second-order term of the dual upper bound.
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Lemma A.19. Fix κ > 0 and assume that XNi(Qˆi) ∈ L1(Qˆi) and EQˆi
[∫ T
0
Es
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
]
< ∞.
Then:
EQˆ
i
[∫
(0,T ]
(∆Zˆi,εt )
2
γiBt
ν(dt)
]
=
1
2
ε
2
3EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ).
Proof. An integration by parts (recalling that AT+ = 0, ∆Zˆ
i,ε
0 = 0 and A is of finite variation),
Itô’s formula, and recalling that 〈∆Zˆi,ε〉 = (1 + ∆Zˆi,ε)2(λi,ε)21J0,τ˜εK • I, A is uniformly bounded
and ∆Zˆi,ε is a bounded martingale give
EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
(∆Zˆi,εt )
2
γiBt
ν(dt)
]
= EQˆ
i
[
−
∫ T
0
(∆Zˆi,εt )
2
γi
dAt+
]
= EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
At
γi
d(∆Zˆi,εt )
2
]
= EQˆ
i
[
2
∫ T
0
At
γi
∆Zˆi,εt d∆Zˆ
i,ε
t +
∫ τ˜ iε
0
At
γi
(1 + ∆Zˆi,εt )
2(λi,εt )
2 dt
]
= EQˆ
i
[∫ τ˜ iε
0
At
γi
(1 + ∆Zˆi,εt )
2(λi,εt )
2 dt
]
.
Now using that |∆Zˆi,ε| ≤ 12ε
1
12 , the claim follows from Lemmas A.14 and E.2 and dominated
convergence.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Using the results and estimates established above, we now prove Theorem 3.2.
Additional notation and preliminary estimates. To ease notation, define
∆ci,D,ε := −εα
iE
A
• ‖ϕˆi,ε‖, (A.49)
∆ci,I,ε :=
∆ϕˆi,ε
A
1J0,τˆ iεK • S,
∆ci,τ,ε :=
`i − ϕˆi
A
1Kτ iε,T K • S,
as well as
∆ci,ε := ∆ci,D,ε + ∆ci,I,ε + ∆ci,D,ε.
Then, ∆ci,D,ε, ∆ci,I,ε, and ∆ci,τ,ε correspond to the consumption correction due to direct trans-
action costs, indirect transaction costs, and liquidation costs, respectively; ∆ci,ε is the total con-
sumption correction.
We proceed to show that the consumption corrections ∆ci,D,ε and ∆ci,I,ε are uniformly
bounded and of order o(1) and that (∆ci,τ,ε)∗T is square integrable under P . Define
Υi,D,ε; = −εαiE • ‖ϕˆi,ε‖,
Υi,I,ε := ∆ϕˆi,ε1J0,τˆ iεK • S,
Υi,τ,ε := (`i − ϕˆi)1Kτˆ iε,T K • S.
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By the definitions of τˆ i,Dε and τˆ i,Iε , and τˆ iε ≤ τ i,Dε ∧ τ i,Iε ,
∣∣∣Υi,D,εT ∣∣∣ = ∫ τˆ iε
0
εαiEt d‖ϕi,ε‖t + εαiEτˆ iε |ϕ
i,ε
τˆ iε
− `i|1{τˆ iε<T} ≤ αiε
2
9
κ
1+κ ≤ ε 29 κ1+κ ,
∣∣∣Υi,I,εT ∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ τˆε
0
∆ϕi,εt dSt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε 19 κ1+κ .
Since ΥD,ε is nondecreasing and Υi,I,ε is a Qˆi-martingale, we obtain that
(
Υi,D,ε
)∗
T
≤ ε 29 κ1+κ and(
Υi,I,ε
)∗
T
≤ ε 19 κ1+κ . Moreover,
(
Υi,τ,ε
)∗
T
≤ 2 ((`i − ϕˆi) • S)∗
T
.
Hence, Lemma E.8 gives
(
∆ci,D,ε
)∗
T
≤ 2
AT
(
Υi,D,ε
)∗
T
≤ 2
AT
ε
2
9
κ
1+κ , (A.50)(
∆ci,I,ε
)∗
T
≤ 2
AT
(
Υi,I,ε
)∗
T
≤ 2
AT
ε
1
9
κ
1+κ , (A.51)(
∆ci,τ,ε
)∗
T
≤ 2
AT
(
Υi,τ,ε
)∗
T
≤ 4
AT
(
(`i − ϕˆi) • S)∗
T
. (A.52)
Moreover, note that by Xϕˆi(P ) ∈ L2(P ) and Lemma E.4.
E
[((
`i − ϕˆi) • S)∗
T
)2]
<∞. (A.53)
Admissibility of candidate strategy/consumption pair. We proceed to show that the
candidate strategy/consumption pair (ϕˆi,ε, cˆi,ε) is in Aεi(ϕˆi0, Y i). By construction, ϕˆi,ε0 = ϕi,ε0 =
ϕˆi0. Moreover, τˆ iε ≤ τ i,Iε implies |(∆ϕi,ε • S)τˆ
i
ε | ≤ ε 19 κ1+κ and yields
ϕˆi,ε • S = (ϕˆi • S)τˆ
i
ε + (∆ϕi,ε • S)τˆ
i
ε + `i(S − S τˆ iε)
≥ (ϕˆi • S)τˆ iε − ε 19 κ1+κ + `i(S − S τˆ iε).
Hence, for any Q ∈ M2(S), the local Q-martingale ϕˆi,ε • S is bounded from below by the Q-
supermartingale (ϕˆi • S)τˆ
i
ε + `i(S − S τˆ iε)− ε 19 κ1+κ . Hence, it also is a Q-supermartingale.
Moreover, by feasibility of cˆi, (A.50)-(A.52) and the estimate (A.53), we obtain
E
(∫ T
0
|cˆi,εt | ν(dt)
)2 ≤ 2E
(∫ T
0
|cˆit| ν(dt)
)2+ 2E
(∫ T
0
|∆ci,εt | ν(dt)
)2 <∞.
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Finally, the definition of cˆi,ε, Lemma E.8 and the fact that Xϕˆ
i,cˆi
T = 0 give
Xϕˆ
i,ε,cˆi,ε,εi
T =
∫ T
0
ϕˆi,εt dSt −
∫ T
0
εit d‖ϕˆi,ε‖t −
∫ T
0
cˆi,ε
Bt
ν(dt) + Y iT
=
∫ T
0
ϕˆit dSt −
∫ T
0
(ϕˆit − ϕˆi,εt ) dSt −
∫ T
0
αiεEt d‖ϕˆi,ε‖t
−
∫ T
0
cˆ
Bt
ν(dt)−
∫ T
0
∆ci,ε
Bt
ν(dt) + Y iT
= Xϕˆ,cˆT + 0 = 0.
In summary, (ϕˆi,ε, cˆi,ε) ∈ Aεi(ϕˆi0, Y i) as claimed.
Primal lower bound. Next, we establish the asymptotic formula (3.8) for the performance of
our candidate policy. Note that in view of (3.9), it suffices to prove this with “=” replaced by “≥”.
Let ε ∈ (0, 1). For fixed t and ω, a Taylor expansion of order two with Lagrange remainder term
gives
U it
(
cˆi,εt
)
= U it (cˆ
i
t) + U
i′
t (cˆ
i
t)
(
cˆi,εt − cˆit
)
+
1
2
U i′′t (cˆ
i
t)
(
cˆi,εt − cˆit
)2
+
1
6
U i′′′t (c˜(t, ω))
(
cˆi,εt − cˆit
)3
,
where c˜(t, ω) takes values in the interval with endpoints cˆit(ω) and cˆ
i,ε
t (ω). Since U i′ is nonincreas-
ing and U i′′′ = −γiU i′′ = (γi)2U i′, we obtain
U it
(
cˆi,εt
)
≥ U it (cˆt) + U i′t (cˆit)
(
∆ci,ε − γ
i
2
(
∆ci,ε
)2 − (γi)2
6
exp
(
γi
∣∣∆ci,εt ∣∣) ∣∣∆ci,ε∣∣3) . (A.54)
We proceed to derive a lower bound for
−γ
i
2
(
∆ci,ε
)2 − (γi)2
6
exp
(
γi
∣∣∆ci,εt ∣∣) ∣∣∆ci,ε∣∣3 . (A.55)
First, consider (A.55) on the event {τˆ iε = T}. Then ∆ci,τ,ε = 0 and ∆ci,ε = ∆ci,D,ε + ∆ci,I,ε.
Using that |∆ci,D,ε|, |∆ci,I,ε| ≤ 2AT ε
1
9
κ
1+κ by (A.50) and (A.51) gives
(
−γ
i
2
(
∆ci,ε
)2 − (γi)2
6
exp
(
γi
∣∣∆ci,εt ∣∣) ∣∣∆ci,ε∣∣3)1{τˆε=T}
≥ −γ
i
2
(
∆ci,D,ε + ∆ci,I,ε
)2(
1 +
γi
3
exp
(
4
AT
γi
)
4
AT
ε
1
9
κ
1+κ
)
1{τˆε=T}. (A.56)
Since ∆ci,D,ε is nonpositive and |∆ci,D,ε|+ 2|∆ci,I,ε| ≤ 6AT ε
1
9
κ
1+κ by (A.50) and (A.51) , we have
the following estimate:
(∆ci,D,ε + ∆ci,I,ε)2 ≤ (∆ci,I,ε)2 −∆ci,D,ε(|∆ci,D,ε|+ 2|∆ci,I,ε|)
≤ (∆ci,I,ε)2 −∆ci,D,ε 6
AT
ε
1
9
κ
1+κ .
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Plugging this into (A.56), setting C2 := 43
γi
AT
exp
(
4
AT
γi
)
and using that 1{τˆ iε=T} ≤ 1 gives(
−γ
i
2
(
∆ci,ε
)2 − (γi)2
6
exp
(
γi
∣∣∆ci,εt ∣∣) ∣∣∆ci,ε∣∣3)1{τˆ iε=T}
≥ −γ
i
2
(
(∆ci,I,ε)2 − 6
AT
ε
1
9
κ
1+κ∆ci,D,ε
)(
1 + C2ε
1
9
κ
1+κ
)
. (A.57)
Next, consider (A.55) on the event {τˆ iε < T}. The series expansion of the exponential function
implies that, for x ≥ 0,
exp
(
γi
κ
2
x
)
≥ 1
2
(
γi
κ
2
x
)2
+
1
6
(
γi
κ
2
x
)3
=
γi
2
x2
γiκ2
4
+
(γi)2
6
x3
κ3γi
8
≥ γ
iκ2
8
min(1, κ)
(
γi
2
x2 +
(γi)2
6
x3
)
.
Whence, for x ≥ 0:
γi
2
x2 +
(γi)2
6
exp
(
γix
)
x3 ≤ exp (γix)(γi
2
x2 +
(γi)2
6
x3
)
≤ 8
γiκ2 min(1, κ)
exp
(
γix
)
exp
(
γi
κ
2
x
)
=
8
γiκ2 min(1, κ)
exp
(
γi
(
1 +
κ
2
)
x
)
.
Using that |∆ci,D,ε|, |∆ci,I,ε| ≤ 2AT ε
1
9
κ
1+κ by (A.50) and (A.51) it follows that
(
−γ
i
2
(
∆ci,ε
)2 − (γi)2
6
exp
(
γi
∣∣∆ci,εt ∣∣) ∣∣∆ci,ε∣∣3)1{τˆ iε<T}
≥ − 8
γiκ2 min(1, κ)
exp
(
γi
(
1 +
κ
2
) ∣∣∆ci,εt ∣∣)1{τˆ iε<T}
≥ −C3 exp
(
γi
(
1 +
κ
2
) ∣∣∆ci,τ,εt ∣∣)1{τˆ iε<T}, (A.58)
where
C3 :=
8
γiκ2 min(1, κ)
exp
(
4
AT
γi
(
1 +
κ
2
))
.
Plugging (A.57) and (A.58) into (A.54) gives
U it (cˆ
i,ε
t )− U it (cˆit) ≥ U i′t (cˆt)
((
∆ci,D,εt + ∆c
i,I,ε
t + ∆c
i,τ,ε
t
)
+
3γi
AT
∆ci,D,εt
(
ε
1
9
κ
1+κ + C2ε
2
9
κ
1+κ
)
− γ
i
2
(
∆ci,I,εt
)2(
1 + C2ε
1
9
κ
1+κ
)
− 1{τˆε<T}C3 exp
(
γi
(
1 +
κ
2
) ∣∣∣∆ci,τ,εt ∣∣∣)
)
. (A.59)
We now calculate the expectation of the ν-integral of the all the terms on the right-hand side of
35
(A.59). To this end, we use the first-order condition U i′t (cˆit) =
Zˆit
Bt
.
First, by Bayes’ theorem [34, Corollary A.2(b)] and Lemmas E.8, A.9, E.2 and A.6, we obtain
E
[∫ T
0
U i′t (cˆ
i
t)∆c
i,D,ε
t ν(dt)
]
= EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
∆ci,D,εt
Bt
ν(dt)
]
= EQˆ
i
[
Υi,D,εT
]
= EQˆ
i
[
−
∫ τˆ iε
0
εαiEs d‖ϕi,ε‖s − εαiEτˆ iε |ϕ
i,ε
τˆ iε
− `i|1{τˆ iε<T}
]
= −1
2
ε
2
3EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ). (A.60)
Second, Bayes’ theorem [34, Corollary A.2(a)], Lemma E.8 and the Qˆi-martingale property of
Υi,I,ε and Υi,τ,ε give
E
[∫ T
0
U i′t (cˆ
i
t)∆c
i,I,ε
t ν(dt)
]
= EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
∆ci,I,εt
Bt
ν(dt)
]
= EQˆ
i
[
Υi,I,εT
]
= 0, (A.61)
E
[∫ T
0
U i′t (cˆ
i
t)∆c
i,τ,ε
t ν(dt)
]
= EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
∆ci,τ,εt
Bt
ν(dt)
]
= EQˆ
i
[
Υi,τ,εT
]
= 0. (A.62)
Third, it follows from (A.60) that
E
[∫ T
0
U i′t (cˆ
i
t)
3γi
AT
∆ci,D,εt
(
ε
1
9
κ
1+κ + C2ε
2
9
κ
1+κ
)
ν(dt)
]
= o(ε
3
2 ). (A.63)
Fourth, we proceed to show that
E
[∫ T
0
U i′t (cˆ
i
t)
(
−γ
i
2
(
∆ci,I,εt
)2 (
1 + C2ε
1
9
κ
1+κ
))
ν(dt)
]
= −1
4
ε
2
3EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
αiEt
∆ϕit
Σϕˆ
i
t dt
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ). (A.64)
To this end, it suffices to show that
EQˆ
i
∫ T
0
γi
(
∆ci,I,εt
)2
Bt
ν(dt)
 = 1
2
ε
2
3EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
αiEt
∆ϕit
Σϕˆ
i
t dt
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ). (A.65)
An integration by parts (recalling that AT+ =: 0 and ∆c
i,I,ε
0 = 0), the definition of ∆c
i,I,ε, Itô’s
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formula and the identity γ
i
A (∆ϕ
i,ε)2ΣS = 32ε
2
3 (N i,ε)2 α
iE
∆ϕi
Σϕˆ
i
give
∫ T
0
γi(∆ci,I,εt )
2
Bt
ν(dt) = −
∫ T
0
γi
(
∆ci,I,εt
)2
dAt =
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0
γiAt d
(
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= 2γi
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Υi,I,εt− dΥ
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γi
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= 2γi
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ΣSt dt
= 2
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i,I,ε
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3
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ε
2
3
∫ τˆε
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(N i,εt )
2α
iEt
∆ϕit
Σϕˆ
i
t dt.
As Υi,I,ε− • Υi,I,ε is a Qˆ-martingale (because Υi,I,ε is a bounded Qˆ-martingale), (A.65) follows
from Lemmas A.4 and E.2.
Finally, Bayes’ theorem [34, Corollary A.2.(a)], the fact that 1/B is uniformly bounded from
above, Hölder’s inequality with p = 1 + κ2 and q = 1 +
2
κ , Lemma E.6, Assumption A.2 (with
C˜3 := C3(ν((0, T ])
(
1
B
)∗
T
) together with Lemmas A.10 and A.11 show
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κ
= o(ε
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3 ). (A.66)
Combining (A.60) – (A.66) yields (3.8) with “≥”.
Dual upper bound. We proceed to establish the asymptotic upper bound (3.9) for any admis-
sible policy. To this end, note that in view of (3.8), it suffices to prove this with “=” replaced
by “≥”. Fix ε ∈ (0, 1). Consider any admissible strategy/consumption pair (ϕε, cε) ∈ Aεi(ϕˆi0, Y i)
with E
[∫ T
0
U i−t (c
ε
t ) ν(dt)
]
< ∞. We want to establish an upper bound for U it (cεt ). To this end,
define the martingale (Zˆi,εt )t∈[0,T ] by
Zˆi,εt = Zˆ
i
tZ
i,ε
t = Zˆt(1 + ∆Zˆ
i,ε
t ), t ∈ [0, T ].
By definition of the conjugate U˜ i(y) = supx∈R(U i(x)− xy), we have the pointwise inequality
U it (c
ε
t ) ≤ U˜ it
(
Zˆi,εt
Bt
)
+
Zˆi,εt
Bt
cεt . (A.67)
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We proceed to establish an upper bound for U˜ it
(
Zˆi,εt
Bt
)
. For fixed t and ω, a Taylor expansion of
order two with Lagrange remainder term gives
U˜ it
(
Zˆi,εt
Bt
)
= U˜ it
(
Zˆit
Bt
)
+ U˜ i′t
(
Zˆit
Bt
)
Zˆit
Bt
∆Zˆi,εt +
1
2
U˜ i′′t
(
Zˆit
Bt
) (
Zˆit
)2
B2t
(
∆Zˆi,εt
)2
+
1
6
U˜ i′′′t (ζ(t, ω))
(
Zˆit
)3
B3t
(∆Zˆi,εt )
3, (A.68)
where ζ(t, ω) lies in the interval with endpoints Zˆ
i
t(ω)
Bt(ω)
and Zˆ
i,ε
t (ω)
Bt(ω)
. Using −U˜ i′ = (U i′)−1 together
with the first-order condition U ′(cˆit) =
Zˆit
Bt
and the fact that U i(x) = − exp(−γix) gives U˜ i′t
(
Zˆit
Bt
)
=
−cˆit, U˜ i′′t
(
Zˆit
Bt
)
= 1γi
Bt
Zˆit
and U˜ i′′′t (ζ) = − 1γiζ2 . Plugging this into (A.68) and using that Zˆi,εt ≥ Zˆ
i
t
2
gives
U˜ it
(
Zˆi,εt
Bt
)
≤ U˜ it
(
Zˆit
Bt
)
− Zˆit∆Zˆi,εt
cˆit
Bt
+
1
2
Zˆit
(
∆Zˆεt
)2
γiBt
+
2
3
Zˆit
∣∣∆Zˆi,εt ∣∣3
γiBt
. (A.69)
By definition of U˜ i, the fact that U i is increasing and C1 on R, and the first-order condition (3.3),
we obtain
U˜ i
(
Zˆit
Bt
)
= U i
(
(U i′)−1
(
Zˆit
Bt
))
− (U i′)−1
(
Zˆit
Bt
)
Zˆit
Bt
= U it (cˆ
i
t)− cˆit
Zˆit
Bt
. (A.70)
Now plugging (A.69) and (A.70) into (A.67) yields
U it (c
ε
t )− U it (cˆit) ≤
Zˆi,εt
Bt
(cεt − cˆit) +
1
2
Zˆit
(
∆Zˆi,εt
)2
γiBt
(
1 +
4
3
∣∣∆Zˆi,εt ∣∣) . (A.71)
We proceed to calculate the expectation of the ν-integral of both terms on the right-hand side of
(A.71). First, by Bayes’ theorem [34, Corollary A.2.(b)], the budget constraint (2.10) for cε, the
budget constraint (2.6) for cˆ (which is binding), and Lemmas A.17 and A.18, we obtain
E
[∫ T
0
Zˆi,εt
cεt − cˆit
Bt
ν(dt)
]
= E
[
Zˆi,εT
∫ T
0
cεt − cˆit
Bt
ν(dt)
]
≤ Zˆi0EQˆ
i,ε [
ϕε • ST − εαiE • ‖ϕε‖T + Y iT − ϕˆi • ST − Y iT
]
≤ o(ε 23 )− ε 23 Zˆi0EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
]
. (A.72)
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Next, Bayes’ theorem [34, Corollary A.2.(b)]), Lemma A.19 and |∆Zi,ε| ≤ 12ε
1
12 give
1
2
E
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Zˆit
(
∆Zˆi,εt
)2
γiBt
(
1 +
4
3
∣∣∆Zˆi,εt ∣∣) ν(dt)
]
=
1
2
Zˆi0E
Qˆi
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(0,T ]
1
γiBt
(
∆Zˆi,εt
)2(
1 +
4
3
∣∣∆Zˆi,εt ∣∣) ν(dt)
]
=
1
4
ε
2
3 Zˆi0E
Qˆi
[∫ T
0
αiEs
∆ϕis
Σϕˆ
i
s ds
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ). (A.73)
Combining (A.72) and (A.73) then finally yields (3.9) (with “=” replaced by “≥”.) This completes
the proof of Theorem 3.2.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 3.4
We apply [34, Theorem 4.1 and Remark 4.2]. To this end, we need to show that the candidate
consumption rate cˆ3,ε is feasible (with binding budget constraint). Noting that
cˆ3,ε := cˆ3 + ∆c3,ε = −∆c1,D,ε −∆c2,D,ε,
with ∆c1,D,ε and ∆c2,D,ε as in (A.49), it follows from feasibility of cˆ3 and (A.50) that
E
(∫ T
0
∣∣cˆ3,εt ∣∣ ν(dt)
)2 ≤ 2E
(∫ T
0
∣∣cˆ3t ∣∣ ν(dt)
)2+ 2E
(∫ T
0
∣∣∆c3,εt ∣∣ ν(dt)
)2 <∞.
Next, feasibility of cˆ3 (with equality in the budget constraint), the definition of ∆ci,D,ε and Lemma
E.8 give ∫ T
0
cˆ3,εt
Bt
ν(dt) =
∫ T
0
cˆ3t
Bt
ν(dt)−
∫ T
0
∆c1,D,εt
Bt
ν(dt)−
∫ T
0
∆c2,D,εt
Bt
ν(dt)
= Y 3T + ε
i • ‖ϕˆ1,ε‖T + εi • ‖ϕˆ2,ε‖T = Y 3 + ∆Y ε.
Next, using a similar estimate as in (A.63), it follows that
E
[∫
[0,T ]
−U3′′t (cˆt − |∆c3,εt |)(∆c3,εt )2 µ(dt)
]
= Zˆ30E
Qˆ3
[∫
[0,T ]
γ3 exp(γ3|∆c3,εt |)(∆c3,εt )2 µ(dt)
]
= o(ε
2
3 ).
By [34, Remark 4.2], it remains to show that
E
[∫ T
0
U i′t (cˆ
3
t )(cˆ
3,ε
t − cˆ3t ) ν(dt)
]
=
1
2
ε
2
3 Zˆ30E
Qˆ3
[∫ T
0
Es
(
α1
∆ϕ1s
Σϕˆ
1
s +
α2
∆ϕ2s
Σϕˆ
2
s
)
ds
]
+ o(ε
2
3 ).
This follows as in (A.60) using Bayes’ theorem [34, Corollary A.2.(a)], Lemmas E.8, A.9, E.2 and
A.6, as well as limε→0 Qˆ3[τˆ iε < T ] = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} (this uses that Qˆ3 ≈ Qˆ1, Qˆ2).
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B Proof of Stability Result
With the individual asymptotically optimal policies of Agents 1,2, and 3 at hand, we can now
prove our main result, Theorem 4.1.
To this end, first notice that individual asymptotic optimality for all agents follows from
Theorems 3.2 and 3.4. Moreover, the definitions of α1 and α2 yield α1 + α2 = 1. So it remains to
verify that both the stock and goods market clear.
To establish stock market clearing, the crucial observation is that frictionless stock market
clearing ϕˆ1 + ϕˆ2 implies that
〈ϕˆ2〉 = 〈1− ϕˆ1〉 = 〈ϕˆ1〉,
so that Σϕˆ
1
= Σϕˆ
2
. This has far reaching consequences. First, together with the definitions of α1
and α2 as well as ∆ϕ1 and ∆ϕ2 we obtain
∆ϕ1 =
(
3
2
α1Et
At
γ1
Σϕˆ
1
ΣS
) 1
3
=
(
3
2
Et
At
γ1 + γ2
Σϕˆ
1
ΣS
) 1
3
=
(
3
2
Et
At
γ1 + γ2
Σϕˆ
2
ΣS
) 1
3
=
(
3
2
α2Et
At
γ2
Σϕˆ
2
ΣS
) 1
3
= ∆ϕ2.
Whence the (normalized) half-widths of the no-trade regions of agent 1 and 2 coincide. This means
that one agent is willing to buy when the other one wants to sell and vice versa, so that
∆ϕ1,ε = −∆ϕ2,ε. (B.1)
Together with the frictionless stock market clearing condition ϕˆ1 + ϕˆ2 = 1, this yields
ϕ1,ε + ϕ2,ε = 1.
This immediately gives (frictional) stock market clearing once we have shown that the respective
liquidation times coincide:
τˆ1ε = τˆ
2
ε . (B.2)
By the definition of τˆ1ε and τˆ2ε in (A.23), it suffices to argue that32
τ1,Dε = τ
2,D
ε . (B.3)
and
τ1,Iε = τ
2,I
ε , (B.4)
where the stopping times τˆ1,Dε and τˆ2,Dε are defined in (A.18), and τˆ1,Dε and τˆ2,Dε are defined in
(A.21), respectively. Now (B.3) follows from ‖ϕ1,ε‖ = ‖ϕ2,ε‖ by (B.2) and |ϕˆ1− 12 | = |1−ϕˆ2− 12 | =
|− ϕˆ2 + 12 | = |ϕˆ2− 12 |, where we have used frictionless stock market clearing. Likewise (B.4) follows
from |∆ϕ1,ε • S| = |∆ϕ2,ε • S|, where we have used (B.1).
To establish goods market clearing, use the frictionless goods market clearing cˆ1 + cˆ2 + cˆ3 =
32The stopping time τEε defined in (A.5) is evidently the same for both agents.
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y1 + y2 + y3 + δ, the frictionless stock market clearing ϕˆ1 + ϕˆ2 = 1 and the frictional stock market
clearing ϕˆ1,ε + ϕˆ2,ε = 1, obtaining
cˆ1,ε + cˆ2,ε + cˆ3,ε = cˆ1 − ε
1
A
• ‖ϕˆ1,ε‖+ ϕˆ
1,ε − ϕˆ1
A
• S + cˆ2 − ε
2
A
• ‖ϕˆ2,ε‖+ ϕˆ
2,ε − ϕˆ2
A
• S
+ cˆ3 +
ε1
A
• ‖ϕˆ1,ε‖+ ε
2
A
• ‖ϕˆ2,ε‖
= cˆ1 + cˆ2 + cˆ3 +
ϕˆ1,ε + ϕˆ2,ε − ϕˆ1 − ϕˆ2
A
• S
= δ +
1− 1
A
• S = δ.
This completes the proof.
C Proof of Example
In this appendix, we show that the asset prices and strategies proposed in Section 5.2 form indeed
an equilibrium for the economy from Section 5.1 . The starting point is the unique solution r(t)
of the integral equation (5.6), whose existence is established in Appendix D. It is used to define
the martingales
dM it = −λS(t) dW δt − γi
√
Σyi(t) dW it + γ
ih(t)σξ
i
(t) dW ξt , M
i
0 = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, (C.1)
where the deterministic continuous function h : [0, T ]→ R is given by
h(t) =
∫ T
t
A(u)
A(t)
λS(u) du, (C.2)
and the constants
S0 = A(0)δ0 −
∫ T
0
A(t)(g1(t) + g2(t) + g3(t)) dt, (C.3)
cˆi0 = y
i
0 + ϕˆ
i
0δ0 +
∫ T
0
A(t)
A(0)
(gi(t)− ϕˆi0(g1(t) + g2(t) + g3(t)) dt, i ∈ {1, 2}, (C.4)
cˆ30 = y
3
0 +
∫ T
0
At
A0
g3t dt, (C.5)
where the deterministic continuous functions g1, g2, g3 : [0, T ]→ R are given by
gi(t) = µy
i
(t)− λS(t)ξi0 − h(t)µξ
i
(t) +
1
2
(
(λS(t))2
γi
− γiΣyi(t)− γih(t)2σξi(t)2
)
+
βi(t)− r(t)
γi
, i ∈ {1, 2}, (C.6)
g3(t) =
β3(t)− r(t)
γ3
. (C.7)
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C.1 Individual optimality
First, we check that the strategy/consumption pairs (ϕˆi, cˆi) given in (5.9), (5.10) and (C.4) are
indeed individually optimal for Agents i = 1, 2, and the consumption rate cˆ3 given in (5.11)
and (C.5) is indeed individually optimal for Agent 3. We only spell out the argument for Agents
i = 1, 2; the argument for Agent 3 is similar but easier. We use Lemma A.1 to verify the optimality
of (ϕˆi, cˆi) for fixed i ∈ {1, 2}.33
Step 1. Define the martingale Zˆi by
Zˆit = γ
i exp(−γicˆi0)E(M i)t (C.8)
and the measure Qˆi ≈ P on FT by
dQˆi =
Zˆit
Zˆi0
dP = E(M i)T dP.
By Girsanov’s theorem and the fact that all integrands in the definition of M i are continuous and
bounded functions, it follows that Qˆi ∈M2(S).
Step 2. We next check that ϕˆi • S is a Qˆi martingale as required for Lemma A.1. By the
definition of ΣS and ϕˆ in (5.7) and (5.9), Bayes’ theorem, Hölder’s inequality (using also that Zi
is square integrable), the fact that A is decreasing, Jensen’s inequality, and the fact that ξi is an
inhomogeneous Brownian motion with drift, we obtain
EQˆ
i [〈ϕˆi • S〉T ]2 = EQˆi [∫ T
0
(ϕˆiu)
2ΣS(u) du
]2
= EQˆ
i
[∫ T
0
A2(u)
(
λS(u)
γi
− ξiu
)2
du
]2
≤ A2(0)E [(ZiT )2]E
(∫ T
0
(
λS(u)
γi
− ξiu
)2
du
)2
≤ TA2(0)E [(ZiT )2]E
[∫ T
0
(
λS(u)
γi
− ξiu
)4
du
]
<∞.
The same calculation with Zˆi replaced by Z, where ZT = dQdP for some Q ∈M2(S) shows that ϕˆi
is admissible.
Step 3. We proceed to verify the first-order condition (A.1). The definition of U i in (3.1), the
dynamics of cˆi in (5.10), and the definition of Zˆi in (C.8) imply
U i′(cˆit) = γ
i exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βi(u) du
)
exp(−γicˆit)
= γi exp(−γicˆi0) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βi(u) du
)
exp
(
−γi
∫ t
0
dcˆiu
)
= γi exp(−γicˆi0) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βiu du
)
exp
(
Mt − 1
2
〈M〉t +
∫ t
0
βi(u) du−
∫ t
0
r(u) du
)
= γi exp(−γicˆi0)E(M)t
1
Bt
=
Zˆit
Bt
.
33For Agent 3, one would instead use [34, Lemma 3.1].
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Step 4. Finally, we check that the budget constraint (2.6) is satisfied with equality. Since
1
Bt
ν(dt) = −dA(t+), an integration by parts (using that A(T+) = 0 and A(0+) = A(0)) yields,
Xϕˆ
i,cˆi,Y i
T = ϕˆ
i
0S0 +
∫ T
0
ϕˆit dSt +
∫ T
0
yit − cˆit
Bt
ν(dt)
= ϕˆi0S0 +
∫ T
0
ϕˆit(µ
S(t) dt+
√
ΣS(t) dWt) +A(0)(y
i
0 − cˆi0) +
∫ T
0
A(t) d(yit − cˆit). (C.9)
Plugging the definitions of ϕˆi, ΣS and µS in (5.9), (5.7) and (5.8) as well as the dynamics of yi
and cˆi in (5.2) and (5.10) into (C.9) and collecting terms, we obtain
Xϕˆ
i,cˆi,Y i
T = ϕˆ
i
0S0 +A(0)(y
i
0 − cˆi0) +
∫ T
0
A(t)
(
λS(t)
γi
− ξit
)
(λS(t) dt+ dW δt )
+
∫ T
0
A(t)
(
µy
i
(t) dt+
√
Σyi(t) dW it + ξ
i
t dW
δ
t
+
1
γi
(
dM it −
1
2
〈M i〉t + (βi(t)− r(t) dt
))
= ϕˆi0S0 +A(0)(y
i
0 − cˆi0)−
∫ T
0
A(t)λS(t)ξit dt+
∫ T
0
A(t)h(t)σξ
i
(t) dW ξt
+
∫ T
0
A(t)
(
µy
i
(t) +
1
2
(λS(t)2
γi
− γiΣyi(t)− γi(t)h2(t)σξi(t)2
)
+
βi(t)− r(t)
γi
)
dt.
In turn, the identities A(t)λS(t) dt = − d(A(t)h(t)) and σξi(t) dW ξ = dξit − µξ
i
t dt as well as an
integration by parts yield
Xϕˆ
i,cˆi,Y i
T = ϕˆ
i
0S0 +A(0)(y
i
0 − cˆi0) +
∫ T
0
ξit d(A(t)h(t)) +
∫ T
0
A(t)h(t) dξit −
∫ T
0
A(t)h(t)µξ
i
t dt
+
∫ T
0
A(t)
(
µy
i
(t) +
1
2
(
(λS(t))2
γi
− γiΣyi(t)− γih2(t)σξi(t)2
)
+
βi(t)− r(t)
γi
)
dt
= ϕˆi0S0 +A(0)(y
i
0 − cˆi0)−A(0)h(0)ξi0 −
∫ T
0
A(t)h(t)µξ
i
(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
A(t)
(
µy
i
(t) +
1
2
(λS(t)2
γi
− γiΣyi(t)− γih2(t)σξi(t)2
)
+
βi(t)− r(t)
γi
)
dt.
Finally, using that ϕˆi0S0 +A(0)(yi0 − cˆi0) =
∫ T
0
A(t)gi(t) dt by the definition of S0 and cˆi0 in (C.3)
and (C.4), noting that A(0)h(0) =
∫ T
0
A(t)λS(t) dt, and recalling the definition of gi in (C.6), we
obtain
Xϕˆ
i,cˆi,Y i
T =
∫ T
0
A(t)gi(t) dt−
∫ T
0
A(t)gi(t) dt = 0.
C.2 Stock and goods market clearing
We proceed to show that the stock and the goods market clear, which together with individual
optimally shown above establishes that we have indeed an equilibrium.
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Stock market clearing follows from the definition of ϕˆi in (5.9) via
ϕˆ1t + ϕˆ
2
t =
1√
Σδ(t)
(
λS(t)
γ1
+
λS(t)
γ2
− ξ1t − ξ2t
)
=
√
Σδ(t)√
Σδ(t)
= 1. (C.10)
For the goods market, it suffices to show that
cˆ10 + cˆ
2
0 + cˆ
3
0 = y
1
0 + y
2
0 + y
3
0 + δ0 (C.11)
and
d(cˆ1t + cˆ
2
t + cˆ
3
t ) = d(y
1
t + y
2
t + y
3
t + δt). (C.12)
The equality (C.11) follows immediately from the definition of cˆ10, cˆ20, cˆ30, and S0 in (C.4), (C.5),
and (C.3) together with initial stock market clearing (ϕˆ10 + ϕˆ20 = 1). To establish (C.12), we plug
in the dynamics of cˆ1, cˆ2, cˆ3, δ, y1, y2 given in (5.10), (5.11), (5.1), (5.2) and use that y3 is constant.
We obtain
d
(
(cˆ1t + cˆ
2
t + cˆ
3
t − (y1t + y2t + y3t + δt)
)
=
2∑
i=1
(
λS(t)
γi
dW δt +
√
Σyi(t) dW it − h(t)σξ
i
(t) dW ξt
)
−
2∑
i=1
(√
Σyi(t) dW it − ξit dW δt
)
−
√
Σδ(t) dW δt
+
2∑
i=1
1
2
(
λS(t)2
γi
+ γiΣy
i
(t) + γih2(t)σξ
i
(t)2
)
dt− β
i(t)− r(t)
γi
dt
− β
3(t)− r(t)
γi
dt−
2∑
i=1
µy
i
(t) dt− µδ(t) dt.
Collecting terms and using that σξ
1
(t)+σξ
2
(t) = 0, we note that all martingale terms cancel. The
remaining deterministic drift also vanishes because r satisfies the integral equation (5.6).
C.3 Applicability of the stability results
Finally, we check that the equilibrium quantities in Section 5.2 satisfy Assumptions A.2 and A.3
for constant transaction costs (E = 1). To this end, we verify the validity of Assumptions A.2
and A.3 for κ = 2. (Note that Q3 = P .) For (A.2), the volatility-of-volatility of the spanned
endowments needs to be small enough:
|σξi(0)|+
∫ T
0
|σξi′(u)|du <
(
1
2
1
2× 2× 42 max(γ1, γ2)2T 2
) 1
2
, for i ∈ {1, 2}. (C.13)
First, as E = 1, it follows that µE,Q = 0 under any Q ≈ P and ΣE = 0.
Second, µS is by (5.8) continuous and deterministic and therefore the same for each Q ≈ P ,
and ΣS = A2Σδ by (5.7) is deterministic in C1 and uniformly bounded above and away from zero.
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Next, if follows from (5.9), (C.8), (C.1) and Girsanov’s theorem that
dϕˆi = −1
2
Σδ′(t)
Σδ(t)
3
2
(
1
γi
λS(t)− ξit
)
dt+
1√
Σδ(t)
(
λS′(t)
γi
− µξi(t)
)
dt+
σξ
i
(t)2√
Σδ(t)
γih(t) dt
+
σξ
i
(t)√
Σδ(t)
dW ξ,Qˆ
i
,
where W ξ,Q
i
is a Qˆi-Brownian motion. Note that the volatilities ξi of the spanned endowments
are (inhomogeneous) Qˆi-Brownians motion with drift as well:
dξi =
(
µξ
i
(t) + σξ
i
(t)2γih(t)
)
dt+ σξ
i
(t) dW ξ,Qˆ
i
.
In particular, Σϕˆ
i
(t) = σξ
i
(t)2/
√
Σδ(t) is deterministic in C1 and uniformly bounded above and
away from zero, and µϕˆ
i,P and µϕˆ
i,Qˆi are the sum of a deterministic continuous function and a
deterministic continuous function times an (inhomogeneous) Brownian motion (under P and Qˆi).
Finally, note that the normalised no-trade regions
∆ϕi(t) =
(
3
2
1
(γ1 + γ2)A(t)
σξ
i
(t)2
Σδ(t)2
) 1
3
are deterministic, in C1, and uniformly bounded above and away from zero. In particular µ∆ϕ
i
is
continuous and deterministic and the same for each Q ≈ P , and Σ∆ϕi = 0.
Putting all the above together, all conditions in A.2 and A.3 (for κ = 2) are immediately seen
to be satisfied, apart from (A.2). To establish (A.2) (for κ = 2), first note that
(ϕˆi − `i)2
A2
ΣS = (ϕˆi − `i)2Σδ =
(
1
γi
λS − ξi0 − (µξ
i
+ (σξ
i
)2γih) • I − σξi •W ξ,Qˆi −
√
Σδ`i
)2
= (f − σξi •W ξ,Qˆi)2 ≤ 2f2 + 2
(
σξ
i
•W ξ,Qˆ
i
)2
,
where f(t) := 1γiλ
S(t) − ξi0 −
∫ t
0
µξ
i
(u) + σξ
i
(u)2γih(u)) du −
√
Σδ(t)`i is deterministic and con-
tinuous. Thus, it suffices to show that
EQˆ
i
[
exp
(
2(γi)242 × 2(σξi •W ξ,Qˆi)2 • IT)] <∞. (C.14)
To establish (C.14), apply an integration by parts to σξ
i
•W ξ,Qˆ
i
to obtain
∣∣∣σξi •W ξ,Qˆit ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣W ξ,Qˆit σξi(0) + ∫ t
0
(W ξ,Qˆ
i
t −W ξ,Qˆ
i
u )σ
ξi′(u) du
∣∣∣∣
≤ ∣∣σξi(0)∣∣∣∣W ξ,Qˆit ∣∣+ ∫ t
0
∣∣σξi′(u)∣∣du sup
u∈[0,t]
|W ξ,Qˆit −W ξ,Qˆ
i
u |
≤
(∣∣σξi(0)∣∣+ ∫ t
0
∣∣σξi′(u)∣∣du) sup
u∈[0,t]
|W ξ,Qˆit −W ξ,Qˆ
i
u | (C.15)
By the fact that (W ξ,Qˆ
i
t − W ξ,Qˆ
i
u )u∈[0,t] is again a Qˆi Brownian motion and by the maximum
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principle for Brownian motion [38, Theorem 13.13], the right-hand side of (C.15) is equal in dis-
tribution to
(∣∣σξi(0)∣∣+ ∫ t
0
∣∣σξi′(u)∣∣du) |W ξ,Qˆit |. Plugging this into (C.14) and using successively
the maximum principle for Brownian motion, the fact that W ξ,Qˆ
i
T is equal in distribution to
√
TN
(where N is standard normal distributed), and Assumption (C.13), we obtain
EQˆ
i
[
exp
(
2(γi)242 × 2
(
σξ
i
•W ξ,Qˆ
i
)2
• IT
)]
≤ EQˆi
[
exp
(
2(γi)242 × 2
(∣∣σξi(0)∣∣+ ∣∣σξi′(u)∣∣ • IT)2 sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣W ξ,Qˆi ∣∣∣2 • IT)]
≤ EQˆi
[
exp
(
2(γi)242 × 2
(∣∣σξi(0)∣∣+ ∣∣σξi′(u)∣∣ • IT)2∣∣∣W ξ,QˆiT ∣∣∣2T)]
≤ E
[
exp
(
2(γi)242 × 2
(∣∣σξi(0)∣∣+ ∣∣σξi′(u)∣∣ • IT)2T 2N 2)]
<∞,
where we have used in the last step that E
[
exp(αN 2)] <∞ for α < 12 . This gives (C.14).
D An integral equation
Consider f1, f2, f3 ∈ C[0, T ] and a finite measure ν on [0, T ] with ν[[0, t]) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, T ].
For a function x ∈ L1[0, T ], define the operators I, J,K : L1[0, T ]→ L1[0, T ] by
Ix(t) =
∫ t
0
x(u) du, (D.1)
Jx(t) =
∫
[0,t)
exp(Ix(u)) ν(du), (D.2)
Kx(t) = f1(t) + f2(t)
(∫ t
0
Jx(u)
Jx(t)
f3(u) du
)2
. (D.3)
Note that for each x ∈ L1[0, T ], Jx is nondecreasing and null at 0. This implies that Kx is well
defined with Kx(0) = f1(0) and satisfies the a priori estimate
|Kx(t)| ≤ |f1(t)|+ |f2(t)|
(∫ t
0
|f3(u)|du
)2
. (D.4)
Lemma D.1. The integral equation
x(t) = Kx(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (D.5)
has a unique solution, which is even in C[0, T ].
Proof. Set BK :=
∫ T
0
(
|f1(t)|+ |f2(t)|
(∫ t
0
|f3(u)|du
)2)
dt <∞ and
BK :=
{
x ∈ L1[0, T ] :
∫ T
0
|x(u)|du ≤ BK
}
.
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It follows from the priori estimate (D.4) thatK maps BK into itself. This implies that if the integral
equation (D.5) has a solution x, then necessarily x ∈ BK . Moreover, x is then automatically
continuous as the right hand side of (D.5) is continuous.
We proceed to show that (D.5) has a unique solution in BK .
For a ∈ R+, define on L1[0, T ] the equivalent norm ‖ · ‖a by
‖x‖a =
∫ T
0
|x(u)| exp(−au) du.
Then BK endowed with the norm ‖ · ‖a is a Banach space. By Banach’s fixed-point theorem, it
suffices to show that for a suitable choice of a, the operator K under the norm ‖·‖a is a contraction
on BK .
Let x1, x2 ∈ BK , set ∆x := |x1 − x2|, and note that
I∆x(T ) =
∫ T
0
|x1(u)− x2(u)|du ≤ 2BK
Moreover,
Ix1(t)− I∆x(t) ≤ Ix2(t) ≤ Ix1(t) + I∆x(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Since t 7→ I∆x(t) is nondecreasing, this estimate gives
Jx1(t) exp(−I∆x(t)) ≤ Jx2(t) ≤ Jx1(t) exp(I∆x(t)), t ∈ [0, T ],
and hence,
Jx1(t)
Jx2(t)
≤ exp(I∆x(t)) and Jx2(t)
Jx1(t)
≤ exp(I∆x(t)), t ∈ (0, T ].
Thus, for 0 < u ≤ t, using that t 7→ I∆x(t) and t 7→ Jx(t) are nondecreasing and that for fixed
w > 0, exp(v)− 1 ≤ exp(w)v for all v ∈ [0, w], we obtain∣∣∣∣Jx1(u)Jx1(t) − Jx2(u)Jx2(t)
∣∣∣∣ = 1{ Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
>
Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
}(Jx1(u)
Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
Jx1(t)
− 1
)
Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
+ 1{ Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
≥ Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
}(Jx2(u)
Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
Jx2(t)
− 1
)
Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
≤ 1{ Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
>
Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
}( exp(I∆x(u) + I∆x(t))− 1)Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
+ 1{ Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
≥ Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
}( exp(I∆x(u) + I∆x(t))− 1)Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
≤ 1{ Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
>
Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
}( exp(2I∆x(t))− 1)
+ 1{ Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
≥ Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
}( exp(2I∆x(t))− 1)
≤ exp(2I∆x(t))− 1
≤ exp(2I∆x(T ))× 2I∆x(t)
≤ 2 exp(4BK)I∆x(t). (D.6)
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As t 7→ Jx(t) is nondecreasing, this yields
|Kx1(t)−Kx2(t)| = |f2(t)|
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
(
Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
+
Jx2(u)
Jx2(t)
)
f3(u) du
∣∣∣∣
×
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
(
Jx1(u)
Jx1(t)
− Jx2(u)
J2x(t)
)
f3(u) du
∣∣∣∣
≤ |f2(t)|
(∫ t
0
2|f3(u)|du
)(
2 exp(4BK)I∆x(t)
∫ t
0
|f3(u)|du
)
≤ 4 exp(4BK)I∆x(t)|f2(t)|t2 sup
0≤u≤t
|f3(u)|2
≤ 4T 2 exp(4BK) sup
0≤u≤T
|f2(u)||f3(u)|2I∆x(t)
=: CKI∆x(t). (D.7)
Now for a := 2CK , by the above and Fubini’s theorem,
‖Kx1 −Kx2‖a =
∫ T
0
|Kx1(u)−Kx2(u)| exp(−au) du
≤ CK
∫ T
0
I∆x(u) exp(−au) du
= CK
∫ T
0
∫ u
0
∆x(s) ds exp(−au) du
= CK
∫ T
0
∆x(s)
∫ T
s
exp(−au) duds
= CK
∫ T
0
∆x(s)
exp(−as)− exp(−at)
a
ds
≤ Ck
a
∫ T
0
∆x(s) exp(−as) ds
=
1
2
‖∆x‖a = 1
2
‖x1 − x2‖a.
This shows that the mapping x 7→ Kx is indeed a contraction on BK with respect to the norm
‖ · ‖a, thereby completing the proof.
E Facts from stochastic analysis
In this appendix, we collect several facts and auxiliary results from stochastic analysis.
E.1 Sp and Hp norms.
First, we recall the fundamental Sp- and Hp-norms for semimartingales (cf. [57] for more details):
Definition E.1. Let p ∈ [1,∞] and Q ≈ P on FT . For an adapted càdlàg process (Xt)t∈[0,T ], the
Sp-norm of X with respect to Q is defined as
‖X‖Sp(Q) := ‖X∗t ‖Lp(Q).
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Stochastic processes converging in S1(Q) converge a fortiori at the time horizon in L1(Q). The
following simple result shows that S1(Q) convergence even implies that the processes converge in
L1(Q) at stopping times converging “stationarily” to the time horizon in probability.
Lemma E.2. Let Q ≈ P on FT be an equivalent measure and
(
(Xεt )t∈[0,T ]
)
ε>0
a family of càdlàg
processes converging in S1(Q) to the adapted càdlàg process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] as ε ↓ 0. Moreover, let
(τε)ε>0 be a family of stopping times satisfying limε↓0Q[τε < T ] = 0. Then:
lim
ε↓0
EQ
[
Xετε
]
= EQ [XT ] . (E.1)
Proof. Convergence of Xε to X in S1(Q) implies in particular that XεT converges in L1(Q) to XT
as ε ↓ 0. Thus, it suffices to show that XεT −Xετε converges in L1(Q) to 0. As (Xε)∗T converges
in L1(Q), there is ε0 > 0, such that for each countable subset I of (0, ε0], the countable subfamily(
(Xε)∗T
)
ε∈I is uniformly integrable under Q. As X
ε
T − Xετε converges to 0 in probability and
|XεT −Xετε | ≤ 2(Xε)∗T , the result follows from the dominated convergence theorem.
Definition E.3. Let p ∈ [1,∞) and Q ≈ P on FT . For an Itô process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] null at 0 with
drift rate µX,Q (under Q) and instantaneous variance ΣX , the Hp-norm of X with respect to Q is
defined as34
‖X‖Hp(Q) :=
∥∥∥∣∣µX,Q∣∣ • IT + (ΣX • IT )1/2∥∥∥
Lp(Q)
.
The following fundamental inequality [57, Theorems V.2 and Theorem V.3] connects the Sp
and Hp norm. It is used repeatedly in various estimates in Appendix A.
Lemma E.4. Let p ∈ [0,∞) and consider an Itô process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] and H ∈ L(X). Then:
‖H • X‖Sp ≤ Cp‖H‖S∞‖X‖Hp , (E.2)
where Cp is a universal constant only depending on p.
E.2 Results from stochastic analysis
The following criterion for local supermartingales to be (true) supermartingales is folklore, but for
lack of references we include its proof:
Lemma E.5. Let (Mt)t∈[0,T ] be a continuous local martingale and (At)t∈[0,T ] a nondecreasing
process null at zero. Then X := M −A is a supermartingale if and only if M is a supermartingale
and E [AT ] <∞.
Proof. If M is a supermartingale and E [AT ] <∞, then X is integrable and the supermartingale
property follows from the supermartingale property of M and the fact that A is nondecreasing.
Conversely, if X is a supermartingale, then X− = max(−X, 0) is a submartingale. Hence it is of
class D by [20, Theorem VI.22b)]. Since M− ≤ X−, we may deduce that M− is of class D, too.
34To be precise, this is a slight abuse of notation, as the usual textbook definition of the Hp(Q)-norm is the
minimum of
∥∥∥‖A‖T + [M ]1/2T ∥∥∥Lp(Qˆ) over all decompositions X = M +A into a local Q-martingale M and a càdlàg
adapted process of finite variation A. It is not clear that the minimum is attained for the canonical decomposition
of X (under Q). However, this is not a problem as both norms are equivalent; see [51].
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Now it follows from [25, Proposition 2.2] that M is a supermartingale. As supermartingales are
integrable, AT = MT −XT is integrable as well.
Doob’s inequality gives rise to the following “exponential BDG inequality” which is used in the
proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma E.6. Let (Mt)t∈[0,T ] be a continuous local martingale. Then
E [exp(M∗T )] ≤ 8E [exp (2〈M〉T )]
Proof. Applying Doob’s inequality [20, Theorem V.24] to the (local) submartingale E [exp(|M |)]
gives
E
[
exp
(
M∗t
)] ≤ 4E [exp(|MT |)] .
Now the result follows from the elementary estimate exp(|MT |) ≤ exp(Mt) + exp(−Mt) and [57,
Theorem III.43].
The following simple consequence of Markov’s inequality is used repeatedly in the estimates
required for the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma E.7. Fix p ≥ 1, q > r ∈ R, α > 0 and let Q ≈ P be an equivalent measure. For ε > 0,
let (Kεt )t∈[0,T ] be an adapted càdlàg process. For ε > 0, define the stopping time
τε = inf {|εqKεt | > αεr} ∧ T.
Suppose that one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) There is a nonnegative adapted càdlàg process (Lt)t∈[0,T ] with L∗T ∈ Lp(Q) and |Kε| ≤ L for
all ε > 0 sufficiently small.
(b) There is a nonnegative adapted càdlàg process (Lt)t∈[0,T ] with L∗T ∈ Lp(Q) and Kε converges
to L in Sp.
(c) Each Kε is a local martingale, and there is a a nonnegative and nondecreasing adapted càdlàg
process (Lt)t∈[0,T ] with LT ∈ Lp/2(Q) and [Kε] ≤ L for all ε > 0 sufficiently small.
Then:
Q[τε < T ] = O(ε
p(q−r)).
Proof. By the definition of τε and Markov’s inequality,
Q[τε < T ] ≤ Q[εq(Kε)∗T > αεr] = Q[(Kε)∗T > αεr−q] = Q[
(
(Kε)∗T
)p
> αpεp(r−q)]
≤ εp(q−r)α−pEQ [((Kε)∗T )p] .
Given (a), the claim follows from lim supε↓0EQ
[(
(Kε)∗T
)p] ≤ EQ [(L∗T )p]. Given (b), the assertion
is a consequence of limε↓0EQ
[(
(Kε)∗T
)p]
= EQ [(L∗T )
p]. Given (c), the claim is implied by
lim sup
ε↓0
EQ
[(
(Kε)∗T
)p] ≤ lim sup
ε↓0
CpE
Q
[(
[Kε]T
)p/2] ≤ CpEQ [Lp/2T ] ,
where Cp is the constant in the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality [38, Theorem 26.12].
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E.3 A result on the annuity process
The following auxiliary result shows how to use the annuity process A to construct an adapted
consumption stream that matches a given (discounted) cumulative endowment at maturity T :
Lemma E.8. Let (Υt)t∈[0,T ] be an adapted làdlàg process. Define the process (cΥ)t∈[0,T ] by
cΥt :=
Υ0
A0
+
∫ t
0
1
At
dΥt.
Then:
(cΥ)∗T ≤
2
AT
Υ∗T , (E.3)
and ∫ T
0
cΥt
Bt
ν(dt) = ΥT . (E.4)
Proof. First, an integration by parts gives
cΥt =
Υt
At
−
∫ t
0
Υt d
(
1
A
)
t
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Taking absolute values and using that 1A is nonnegative and nondecreasing gives (E.3) via∣∣∣∣ΥtAt −
∫ t
0
Υt d
(
1
A
)
t
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Υ∗tAt + Υ∗t
(
1
At
− 1
A0
)
≤ 2
AT
Υ∗T , t ∈ [0, T ].
Next, using the definition of the annuity process A and integrating by parts (noting that
AT+ =: 0 and A0+ = A0), we obtain (E.4) via.∫ T
0
cΥt
Bt
ν(dt) = −
∫ T
0
cΥt dAt+ = −cΥTAT+ + cΥ0 A0 +
∫
(0,T ]
At dc
Υ
t
= Υ0 +
∫
(0,T ]
dΥt = Υ0 + (ΥT −Υ0) = ΥT .
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